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SUMMARY JUDGMENT- A PROPOSAL FOR PROCEDURAL
REFORM IN THE CORE MOTION CONTEXT
KENT SINCLAIR*
PATRICK HANES**
No SPITTING, No SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
-Sign in a federal courthouse in New Orleans.'
This Article examines modern federal-style summary judgment
practice and its antithesis, the current Virginia summary judg-
ment rule. Both could stand improvement. Few models exist,
however, because states have shown little innovation with respect
to summary judgment.2 Focusing on the strengths and weakness-
es of the federal system is thus important. This Article proposes
a new rule for Virginia summary judgment that, for a variety of
reasons explained below, is calculated to be a modest, safe, and
mainstream procedure. This rule would leave the traditional
standards for granting the motion intact, but it reshapes the
procedures of the motion in an effort to facilitate fair and expe-
ditious decisions by trial courts. The safeguards we propose ad-
dress principal criticisms of federal practice in the aftermath of
the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment cases,'
sometimes dubbed the "beast of burdens."4 These criticisms as-
sert that the procedural thresholds are vague and that the pro-
* Professor of Law, Umversity of Virginia. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Umversity of
Califorma.
** Law Clerk for the Honorable Albert V Brian, Jr., United States District Judge,
Eastern District of Virginia. B.A. 1988, Umversity of Virginia, J.D. 1994, University
of Virginia.
1. Steven A. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the
Supreme Court, 6 RRV. LITIG. 263, 264 (1987).
2. Indeed, we found fewer than ten articles on summary judgment in the state
courts in law reviews and bar association publications from the past two decades.
3. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Ariderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
4. Linda S. Mullemix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 433 (1987).
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cess allows a movant unfairly to impose dramatic burdens on the
responding party The mechanisms discussed here deal with both
aspects of concern by focusing on the legal requirements for con-
sideration of summary adjudication and the guidelines provided
by the procedural system for the responsive submissions.
The central concerns of this Article arise in the core summary
judgment situation where the party without the burden of proof
makes a motion asserting a lack of evidence sufficient to warrant
a full hearing on some dispositive issue as to which the
nonmovant has the burden of persuasion. To a large extent, the
issues and procedural devices we explore are applicable to less
common situations. For example, this Article addresses situations
in which a moving defendant concedes that a plaintiff has cogni-
zable evidence to support the focal issue on summary judgment
but asserts that this evidence is insufficient to meet an enhanced
burden of proof threshold applicable to the subject matter of an
action; or in which a plaintiff who admittedly carries the burden
of proof seeks summary judgment against a defendant who
assertedly has entered only a sham defense. However, these and
other, more esoteric contexts are of limited practical incidence,
and there is very real resistance to more broadscale revision of
summary procedure in Virginia. Nevertheless, the system should
at least deal with the bread-and-butter situation adequately
Having worked through this study, it is not clear to the Authors
that the federal approach addresses this problem today, and we
know that the present Virginia rules do not. Hence, the stalking
horse for our discussion in this Article is the capacity of the
mechanisms to deal with the core case.
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE-SOME CONTRASTS AND A
LITTLE HISTORY
Thirty-five years ago, Charles Alan Wright saw in Virginia civil
procedure "an unusual mixture of old and new "' In many ways
his observation remains an accurate description of Virginia civil
procedure today Early in Virginia's history, as a colony and a
state, its courts and legislatures were innovative reformers of
5. Charles A. Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 118 (1959).
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common law procedural conventions. However, throughout this
century, the conventional view of Virginia law, and particularly
its procedural aspects, has been that the system is idiosyncratic,
clinging to much of the symbolism-and the substance-of nine-
teenth-century American jurisprudence.'
Nowhere are such observations more justified than in relation
to pre-trial procedure for summary judgment. The Virginia sum-
mary judgment rule is a terse, bare-boned provision.9 Con-
structed piecemeal from old traditions and glosses from earlier in
this century, the Virginia summary judgment rule has not under-
gone any systematic revision in forty years, despite criticism of,
and proposals to reform, the present rule. Even as the volume of
civil litigation has burgeoned in the modern era, and discovery
tools have been extended to all civil cases, use of pretrial summa-
ry judgment in Virginia has been limited. In part, this reluctance
stems from the absence of clear procedural directions in the rule
itself, from the required and permissible range of steps by the
parties in initiating and responding to a pretrial summary judg-
ment motion, and from the burdens of production in supporting
and opposing such motions. Limitations on the types of evidence
that the trial court may consider in ruling on such an application
6. See, e.g., Robert W. Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Proce-
dure, 38 YALE L.J. 193, 215 (1928) (recognizing Virgnia as one of the first jurisdic-
tions to implement summary proceedings by motion for judgment against certain
classes of defendants for liquidated debts).
7. The continued separation of case filings into actions at law and suits in equity
is one of the more prominent examples of Virginia's reluctance to make procedural
changes too rapidly. See Wright, supra note 5, at 118.
8. Summary judgment in actions at law in Virgina is governed by Rule 3:18; the
nearly identical Rule 2:21 governs cases in equity. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:18, 2:21. The
only subject matter distinction is the prefatory phrase in the equity rule, "[e]xcept in
a suit for divorce or for the annulment of marriage ," that effectively bars the
use of the summary mechanism in those cases. VA. SUP CT. R. 2:21. Because the
remaining textual portions of the two Virgina summary judgment rules are identical,
we will hereinafter refer to one or both rules as the "Rule."
9. Rule 3:18 consists of five sentences, and is only a few lines long. Thus, the
Virginia rule is very different from the summary judgment provisions under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and those of the majority of states that have followed
the federal model. Virgina is also the only jurisdiction that severely curtails by stat-
ute (the effect of which is reiterated in the rule) the types of discovery evidence
which may be used to support a summary judgment motion. See znfra parts III.B.2,
III.B.3.
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also have hampered the use of the summary judgment mecha-
nism. As a result of these limitations, present Virginia courts
rarely employ summary judgment as a general matter.10
Developments in the "federal model" have little appeal for
many in Virginia. In Part ILD, below, we analyze certain features
of federal summary judgment practice with an eye toward distill-
ing the most successful and uncontroversial aspects of that pro-
cess, while isolating the perceived abuses of the federal regime. A
few features of the federal structure appear well-calculated to
assist in formulating a modern Virginia summary judgment doc-
trine. Moreover, the concerns voiced about some aspects of pres-
ent-day federal practice suggest the means by which Virginia can
recast its rule to obviate difficulties experienced elsewhere. The
last thirty years of federal and state experience should be seen as
a laboratory for Virginia summary judgment reform. The Com-
monwealth can employ provisions in fashioning its own rule that
may, in turn, provide a model for other procedural systems na-
tionwide in revamping summary judgment mechanisms.
In the federal system, summary judgment and related pretrial
procedures have become useful tools -for case and docket man-
agement in response to a growth in the volume of litigation and a
perceived need for greater efficiency Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56 on summary judgment ("the federal rule" or "Rule 56")
specifies the burdens of production on movants and opponents.
The federal rule, as interpreted in a trio of celebrated cases,12
allows initiation of the motion in various contexts, and its struc-
ture assures that the nonmoving party responds to the motion
appropriately 13
The central explanation for the shape of federal summary
judgment procedure today reflects the philosophies of judicial
management at play For at least two decades,, the Federal Judi-
10. See rnfra part III.B.
11. See infra parts III.C, III.D.
12. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
13. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (requiring entry of summary judgment




cial Center has taught new federal judges that active judicial
management-characterized by strict time deadlines and firm
"control" of the litigation-shortens disposition times and lowers
the pending docket of open cases. 4 The Supreme Court's 1986
summary judgment decisions were fairly read as underscoring the
propriety of summary adjudication as yet another facet of this
management philosophy, one in which those cases that cannot
present viable fact issues may be weeded from the litigation gar-
den before the preparations fully ripen. Undoubtedly, the lower
courts, at least in the initial months after the 1986 decisions,
were conscious of the new-found legitimacy of summary disposi-
tions. 5 A modicum of post-1986 statistical evidence tenuously
supports the view that the federal courts have increased some-
what their summary adjudication ratio following the clarion call
of Celotex. However, this evidence is neither conclusive nor readi-
ly confirmable. In any case, it seems doubtful that the proportion
of cases summarily determined could have declined in the past
decade compared to the 1960s or 1970s.'6
On the other hand, neither summary judgment practice nor
case management notions are much evident in Virginia jurispru-
dence. Use of summary judgment appears to be far more exten-
sive in all types of cases in the federal courts than in Virginia
courts. With the single exception of the movement to establish
case disposition time standards,i" little evidence exists of any
procedural reform responsive to the increases in filings. For ex-
ample, pretrial conference practice in Virginia is very limited, and
the Commonwealth possesses no analogue to the extensive provi-
sions of Federal Rule 16 on this subject. 8 Virginia summary
14. See, e.g., STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17-18, (1977) (citing speed and efficiency gamed by
active judicial management).
15. See, e.g., Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932 (1987); Raynor v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 643 F.
Supp. 238, 243 (D.D.C. 1986).
16. Our own overview of the statistical experience is set forth m the text accom-
panymg infra notes 115-22.
17. 5 VA. LAW. WKLY., No. 53, May 27, 1991, at 1161.
18. Rule 16, combined with aspects of Rule 26(f), sets in motion a complex pattern
of scheduling and planning orders in federal practice that are intended to be entered
in all categories of cases, save those exempted by affirmative action of the local fed-
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judgment doctrine is largely consistent with this "hands off'
impression of the litigation landscape. Thus, a summary judg-
ment motion is not invited by existing procedures, and almost no
obligations are placed on a party opposing summary judgment as
long as the party can defeat the motion by unsworn allegations in
the pleadings.
Virginia's present summary judgment rule is most consistent
with the view that a judge should be an umpire, not a manager.
Whether such a policy should remain predominant in the face of
serious docket pressures from litigation volume-factors that
have led to more aggressive management approaches in other
jurisdictions-is a question that must be resolved by those
charged with shaping the evolution of the court system in the
Commonwealth. This task falls principally to the Judicial Coun-
cil, the Virginia Supreme Court, and the Legislature. Clearly,
however, some sort of revision is needed in order to provide the
parties with reliable bases for deciding how to proceed in the
production of evidence in support of claims and defenses, how to
aid the trial court in making intelligent decisions on the disposi-
tive applications, and how to avoid the possibility of "forum shop-
ping" by parties who are able to strategically opt out of the Vir-
ginia system.
This Article proposes a revision of the Virginia summary judg-
ment rule along lines that differ significantly from both the fed-
eral model and the current rule. The purpose of the revision is to
redress the growing gap in summary judgment utility between
eral court, and that deal with both discovery issues and general case scheduling and
deadlines. See FED. R. Civ. P 16, 26(f). No such presumptions of regulation are evi-
dent in the analogous Virginia rules. For example, the Virgmia "pretrial procedure"
rule, VA. SUP CT. R. 4:13, leaves the question of whether to summon counsel for the
creation of preparation plans wholly to the discretion of the trial court. Few Virginia
reported cases even apply this rule, and all are from the circuit courts. See London
Towne Homeowners Ass'n v. Greene, 27 Va. Cir. 504, 525 (1990); Gressman v. Peo-
ples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 10 Va. Cir. 397, 411-12 (1988). Furthermore, Virginia
Rule 4:1, which is largely modelled on the 1971 version of Rule 26 of the federal
rules, omits the discovery planning conference portions of the federal rule entirely.
See VA. SUP CT. R. 4:1. Neither the sanction provisions of the Virginia discovery
scope rule, Rule 4:1(g), nor the broad discovery sanction doctrines and procedures of




the Virginia courts and those of other jurisdictions, to regularize
and formalize the burdens on parties in pretrial evidence produc-
tion, and to avoid managerial "overreaching" by courts respond-
ing to summary judgment motions for which the federal regime
has been criticized.
Part II of this Article analyzes the development of summary
judgment in early American courts and the modern federal sys-
tem up to the Supreme Court's strongly managerial interpreta-
tion of Rule 56 in a series of prominent decisions. Part II also
addresses certain responses to this managerial approach to sum-
mary judgment practice.
Part III compares the development of Virginia summary judg-
ment practices, shaped by an adversarial, "anti-managerial" view
and a fear of the expansive reach of summary judgment in con-
nection with other aspects of Virginia law Several reported opin-
ions will illustrate debilitating weaknesses besetting summary
judgment in Virginia. As a result, Virginia summary judgment
practice is more restricted as a litigation tool than in other jurs-
dictions, as the procedures and tLtilization statistics demonstrate.
Some of the infirmities of the current Virginia rule operate as
"traps for the unwary" that can affect both parties, whether
movants or opponents, in summary judgment motions. Part IV
suggests a model for legislative or judicial revision of Virginia's
summary judgment rule. Using the preceding materials and anal-
ysis, this discussion outlines the policy choices and procedural
characteristics that a functional summary judgment doctrine
should embody in order to integrate seamlessly with other fea-
tures of the Virginia litigation landscape. A carefully-tailored rule
can empower trial courts to dispose of truly baseless cases before
they consume an inappropriate share of the energies of the court
and the parties, while at the same time avoiding the excesses that
sometimes are thought to exist in "federal model" jurisdictions.
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II. SUiMY JUDGMENT AND MANAGERIAL COURTS
The principal function of a motion for summary judgment 9 is
to demonstrate, by reference to the available evidence, that an
essential element of a claim or defense is not genuinely contest-
able and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment
as a matter of law Summary judgment has evolved from a cir-
cumscribed procedure in common law actions on debts and con-
tracts into a widely-used pretrial motion permitted in all types of
litigation. °
The motion has also emerged as an integral element of case
management under modern civil procedure systems. Summary
judgment enhances judicial control over the litigation, promotes
resolution of meritless claims at an early stage, and encourages
judges to obviate unnecessary or protracted trials, sparing a
heavily burdened court system from needless extra proceedings.
A. Roots and Development of Summary Judgment
The history of the modern summary judgment procedure began
in 1855 with the passage of Keating's Act by the English Parlia-
ment.2' Keating's Act established a summary proceeding on the
basis of affidavits for the collection of bills of exchange and prom-
issory notes. Subsequently, a number of American jurisdictions
adopted analogous statutes or judicially-created rules for summa-
ry judgment in claims for liability on contracts and debt-enforce-
ment actions.22 These provisions were intended primarily to aid
19. "Summary judgment" is used in this Article to refer to the adjudication of a
pretrial motion, supported by evidence, for judgment or dismissal of all or part of a
claim.
20. Summary judgment may be sought in lawsuits of any subject matter in most
jurisdictions, as is the case in both the federal courts and in almost all states. In
Virginia, summary judgment is allowed except in suits for divorce or annulment of
marriage. VA. SUP CT. R. 2:21. Based on the most recently published statistics, this
means that summary judgment is available in approximately seventy percent of the
civil cases pending in the circuit courts of Virginia. See VIRGINIA STATE OF THE JUDI-
CIARY REPORT 1992, at A-40-42 and Display 22 (1993).
21. Keating's Act (Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act), 1855, 18 & 19
Vict., ch. 67 (Eng); see WILLIAM D. QUARLES ET AL., SUMMARY ADJUDICATION: DIS-
POSITIVE MOTIONS AND SUMMARY TRIALS 85-86 (1991).
22. See, e.g., CONN. R. CIV. PRACT. § 14A(1) (1929) (authonzmg summary judg-
ments on contracts, statutes, and other liquidated claims). For a discussion of early
[Vol. 36:16331640
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plaintiffs in the speedy recovery of liquidated debts from recalci-
trant defendants who posed no genuine defenses but sought to
delay repayment and impose the costs of collection on their
claimants.23
The development of summary proceedings was also a natural
complement to pleading reform, as the charging instrument in
civil practice became simpler and, to some extent, more
opaque.24 In Virginia, the motion for judgment, containing a
statement of allegations, gradually displaced the confusing vari-
ety of common law forms of pleading for different types of ac-
tions.25 Issue-specific pleading practice was clearly a welcomed
reform. The simplified motion for judgment also obscured the
legal bases, or lack thereof, for an action or defense because the
absence of factual support for an essential allegation might not
become clear until the evidence was produced at trial.26 In ef-
fect, the motion for summary judgment enabled a party to
"pierce" fact pleadings and force the opposing party to outline
conceivable theories of recovery or defense. 7 In federal practice
the motion for more definite statement 5 and, in actions at law
in Virginia, the bill of particulars29 offer an opportunity to seek
statutes providing for summary judgment, see Charles E. Clark & Charles U.
Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 440-71 (1929).
23. See, e.g., Gehl v. Baker, 92 S.E. 852, 853 (Va. 1917) (observing that summary
judgment procedure for recovery on contract is intended "to prevent delay caused to
plaintiffs by continuances upon dilatory pleas when no real defenses exist").
24. See MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (noting that federal summary judgment fulfills screening function previous-
ly served by demurrer practice); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439-40, 484
(1986) (discussing elimination of common law pleading practice in modern civil proce-
dure reforms).
25. See Thomas D. Terry, Summary Judgment in Virginia, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV.
353, 354-55 (1960) (discussing successive statutes providing for motions for judgment
in Virgima until the procedure was extended to all motions at law in 1919).
26. See Marcus, supra note 24, at 483 (discussing the difficulty judges face m mak-
ing factual conclusions on the pleadings).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P 56(e) advisory committee's note (1963) ("The very mission
of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the
proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.").
28. FED. R. CIV. P 12(e).
29. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:16(b) (providing for an amended bill of particulars when
the first bill is unclear).
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elucidation of the averments in some instances, but neither pro-
cedure is used often. More importantly for our purposes, these
applications seek further statement of claims by the pleader but
do not provide insight into the existence of evidentiary support
for the claims, even when granted.
A key element of the summary judgment device-and the fea-
ture that distinguishes it from the motion to dismiss/demurrer
phase of procedure-is its focus on the factual proofs that a party
will assert at trial on a particular issue. Many summary judg-
ment decisions amount to a taking of undisputed facts, followed
by a resolution of legal issues raised in a fashion similar to the
review of the sufficiency of a pleading's ability to state a claim.30
Thus, while the court may enter summary judgment on matters
involving legal components,31 the principal role of a summary
judgment review is to accelerate to the pretrial phase the obliga-
tion of the party bearing the burden of proof to demonstrate to
the court that it has at least some evidence on one or more neces-
sary points in the party's case-in-chief. The principal circum-
stances for the consideration and entry of summary judgment,
therefore, are those cases where a party has literally "no evi-
dence" to support one or more necessary elements of the affirma-
tive case." If a party can demonstrate some evidence on each
contested issue, the motion should be denied: A summary judg-
ment motion will not properly provide an occasion for weighing
the competing sets of evidence.3
30. See Blanding v. Pennsylvania State Police, 811 F Supp. 1084, 1088-89 (E.D.
Pa. 1992), affd, 12 F.3d 1303 (3d Cir. 1993).
31. See, e.g., Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 738-41 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993) (federal preemption of state regulation); Key Trust Co. v.
Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, P.C., 811 F Supp. 733, 738-39 (D. Mass.
1993) (statute of limitations); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F.
Supp. 1406, 1413 (D. Del. 1992) (whether discharge of contammants falls within
exclusion clause of insurance policy); Blanding, 811 F. Supp. at 1089-90 (retroactive
application of state statute to the date of the litigated events); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Sky, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 249, 251-55 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (questions of duties
and coverage under insurance policy); Rodziewicz v. Beyer, 809 F Supp. 1164, 1166
(D.N.J. 1992) (res judicata); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 875-78
(Va. 1975) (agency relationship of licensors to licencees).
32. See Harrmgton v. Grayson, 811 F Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (where
there is "no evidence" to support a claim, summary judgment is appropriate).
33. "[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh
1642
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The development of a summary judgment procedure thus
serves two purposes in liberalized pleading regimes. First, sum-
mary judgment preserves the "gatekeeping" function that com-
mon law courts had enforced by requiring issue-specific
pleadings. 4 This function enables judges to dismiss actions that
lack legal merit under the operative facts." When the response
to a motion reveals that the underlying legal issues may be re-
solved without a trial, both justice and judicial efficiency are fur-
thered by an entry of summary judgment." Second, the summa-
ry judgment motion demands that the allegations contained in a
pleading be developed and placed in a legal framework prior to
trial. This "issue focusing" function of summary judgment occurs
whether or not judgment is granted because the motion and re-
sponse thereto put the parties and the court on notice of the
nature of the factual matters genuinely in conflict.3 7
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there
is a genume issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986).
34. See Marcus, supra note 24, at 434-36.
35. Many summary judgment decisions amount to taking undisputed facts and then
resolving legal issues raised in a fashion not unlike the review of the sufficiency of a
pleading to state a claim under Rule 12(b). See Blanding, 811 F. Supp. 1088-89.
36. A just and speedy outcome of a particular action-whether a dismissal or an
entry of judgment-is of primary value to the party that benefits from the ruling.
Judicial efficiency, on the other hand, is a value from which all parties or potential
parties in a jurisdiction benefit. Judicial efficiency is a function that distinguishes
pretrial summary judgment from a trial motion for a directed verdict or a motion to
strike the evidence.
The constitutional right to a trial before a jury is shared by the parties to a
summary judgment motion, parties waiting to utilize the same forum, and parties
who might choose to use the forum. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Therefore, the value of
judicial efficiency should not be understated or minumized as a smple concern over
the waste of societal resources-judicial inefficiency caused by protracted prosecution
of a relatively small number of meritless claims hinders the jury trial rights of all
parties with legitimate- claims for relief.
These concepts can be summarized by reference to the axiom commonly attribut-
ed to Gladstone that "justice delayed is justice denied." See Patrick Johiston, Civil
Justice Reform" Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833,
834 n.4 (1994) (citing LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS 276 (1977)).
37. In a sense, the summary judgment procedure resembles the exchange of rosters
by opposing teams before an athletic contest. Even though the primary purpose of
exchangmg rosters is to enable teams to protest participation of ineligible players, the
ritual also enables the teams and referees to identify the probable matchups that
may determine the outcome of the contest. Likewise, the summary judgment proce-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
B. Federal Rule 56 and Docket Management
An overarching goal of the first complete set of rules governing
federal civil procedure was to facilitate dispositions that were not
only just, but also "speedy and inexpensive."3 A summary judg-
ment rule, adapted from the former common law practice, was in-
cluded as Rule 56." The scope, structure, and elaboration of
Rule 56 differs significantly from earlier state statutes." Rule 56
was the first summary judgment rule to extend the summary
judgment motion to all civil actions, including those formerly in
equity, and to all types of claims, defenses, and issues in such
actions.4 By 1979, forty years after promulgation of the federal
rules, a large proportion of the states had adopted, with some al-
terations, systems of civil procedure in the style of the federal
rules.42 Many had established summary judgment rules, most of
which were modelled on Rule 56."
The Federal Rules created an interlocking structure of pretrial
procedures for the management and disposition of litigation.
Discovery,44 summary judgment, and the pretrial conference45
form important parts of the foundation for "pretrial prac-
tice"-the litigation that occurs between the filing of simple no-
tice pleading documents and trial-the aim of which is to expose
facts and focus upon issues prior to a trial.4 6
The procedures governing this pretrial process, especially un-
der the current versions of these federal rules, invite active case
dure forces all participants to focus on the material issues to be determined.
38. FED. R. CIV. P 1. The Federal Rules, among numerous innovations, abandoned
common law pleading practice in favor of simpler notice pleading concepts. See, e.g.,
id. rule 8(a).
39. See id. rule 56 advisory committee's note.
40. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
41. MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 702 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
42. MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (2d ed. 1979). See John B.
Oakley & Arthur F Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1368-69 (1986).
43. See WARREN FREEDMAN, SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OTHER PRECLUSIVE DEVICES
12 (1989).
44. See FED. R. CIV. P 26.
45. See id. rule 16.
46. See Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 572
(1952) (summary judgment is closely tied to the other pretrial devices).
1644 [Vol. 36:1633
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management by judges, especially in complex and time-consuming
litigation. 7 This invitation is evident not only in the incorpora-
tion of required schedules and planning orders, but also in some
of the fundamental characteristics shared by each of the rules
governing pretrial practice. The judge is empowered to refine and
develop issues for trial, remove frivolous or unsupported claims
and defenses, 8 schedule and order proceedings and discovery, 9
and enforce the mandates of pretrial practice with sanctions that
include dismissal of a claim or defense.5"
In theory, summary judgment fulfills several important func-
tions in this pretrial structure.5 A party almost always has a
strong incentive to move for summary judgment in the hopes of
foreclosing a claim or defense of the adversary (the core motion
context). On the other hand, a party who wants to maintain its
claim or defense must anticipate the motion and seek to develop
an evidentiary theory during discovery and other preparations
sufficient to establish a basis to proceed to trial on the essential
parts of her case.52 Both parties also must anticipate that the
47. Summary judgment "is especially encouraged m complex cases m which issues
of fact may metastasize if the court does not take action to confime the dispute and
proscribe costly overextension of discovery and trial." Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstem, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 n.9
(1990) (quoting FED. REV. CW. P 56 advisory committee's notes, Proposed Rules
170).
48. Note that Rule 56 states that either party may make a motion for summary
judgment, but federal judges apparently have the power to enter summary judgment
sua sponte if the losing party was on notice to come forward with opposing evidence.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (dictum); Page v. DeLaune,
837 F.2d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1988).
The summary judgment motion may be considered and a ruling entered at a
pretrial conference. Rule 16 provides that judges may take action at a pretrial con-
ference with respect to pending motions and "the formulation and simplification of
the issues, including the elimination of frivolous clams or defenses" and "such other
matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action."
FED. R. COV. P 16(c).
49. FED. R. CIV. P 16(b).
50. See zd. rule 16(i) (sanctions for failure to appear); zd. rule 26(g) (sanctions for
failure to certify discovery requests, responses, and objections); id. rule 30(g)
(attorneys' fees sanction for failure to attend subpoena deposition); id. rule 37 (dis-
covery sanctions).
51. See William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and Case Management, 56
ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 228 (1987) ("Summary judgment procedure is a means for cut-
ting rapidly to the core issues of litigation.").
52. See R. Harvey Chappell, Jr., The Discovery Process in Virginia, 37 VA. L. REV.
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other party may have the opportunity at a pretrial conference to
directly inform the judge of potentially dispositive issues and to
shape the discovery in order to address their summary judgment
theory "
Of course, participation in discovery and pretrial conferences is
enforceable in federal practice through the powers of the court to
sanction noncompliance. 4 However, mere participation in pretri-
al proceedings does not necessarily require a proactive or produc-
tive utilization of discovery tools to develop evidence. The likeli-
hood of having to face a ruling on a summary judgment motion is
an additional and positive incentive for active pretrial participa-
tion.55
Of course, these interactive incentives to participate depend
upon the real likelihood that each pretrial tool functions as de-
scribed. In several related areas, the course of federal procedural
reform reflects the fact that lawyers and judges have not been
swift to embrace the proposed procedural improvements of the
system's architects. Discovery devices, for example, were made
available in all actions in the original federal rules. Some thirty
years later, in 1969, the revisors undertook sweeping revisions, a
major thrust of which was to eliminate the need for permission to
engage in discovery activities." A similar deafening silence at-
151, 160 (1951) (arguing that Virginia summary judgment procedure provides a po-
tential source of discovery aid).
53. See Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 220-22 (discussing the strategic incentives of
counsel under Rules 16 and 56, noting that "[alttorneys should therefore have Rule
56 in mind in nearly all cases from the outset of the litigation").
54. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P 16(f), 26(g).
55. Thus, summary judgment is both a carrot and a stick because as much as it is
used to punish the recalcitrant party, it also rewards the party that best utilizes the
pretrial procedures to either underminme or bolster a claim or defense. From the
movant's point of view, summary judgment can be an opportunity to terminate liti-
gation before trial. From the nonmovant's point of view, summary judgment can be
an opportunity to validate the viability of a claim or defense and, in a sense, arm it
for the "main event" before a jury.
56. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 525-27 (1969) (dropping the former requirement of good
cause to seek production of documents or physical evidence in proposed Rule 34). In
large measure, this under-use was thought to flow from the requirement to obtain
court permission for use of the devices. The 1969 revisions eliminated that re-
quirement for the principal discovery devices. See id. at 508-13, 520-22, 525-26, 530-
31 (proposed Rules 30, 33, 34 and 36). Only the personally intrusive features of the
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tended original Rule 16. While some districts of the federal sys-
tem utilized the process more than others,57 and some academics
praised the process,"8 courts did not apply uniform pressure for
regular conferencing and active dispute resolution and prepara-
tions management that such meetings facilitate.59 Only with the
revision of Rule 16 in 1983, when a "mandatory" obligation to
generate schedule orders was grafted onto the text, did the pre-
trial rule begin to pressure judges to assume a managerial pos-
ture.60 Similarly, owing in part to the restrictive attitudes of
some appellate courts, the summary judgment provisions of Rule
56 did not lead to a significant number of summary dispositions
in civil cases.6 '
physical or mental examination of a person were deemed to require the intervention
of the court prior to initiation of discovery. See id. at 528-53 (proposed Rule 35 and
advisory committee note).
57. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1981-82 (1989); Edson R. Sunderland, Proce-
dure for Pretrial Conferences in the Federal Courts, 3 WYO. L.J. 197, 202-03 (1949).
58. See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE
5 (1964); cf William L. Walker & John W. Thibaut, An Experimental Examination of
Pretrial Conference Techniques, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1971) (acknowledgmg
the early enthusiasm for pretrial conferences, but recogmzing "a growing and perhaps
dominant point of view [that] , [als applied , pretrial procedures have re-
sulted in useless, unnecessary, unprofitable, expenditures of time, effort and expense
in the majority of litigation").
59. See generally Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST.
L.J. 163, 165 (1956) (calling for the judge to be the "primary architect" of the case);
Alfred P Murrah, The Pretrial Conference: Conceptions and Misconceptions, 44 A.B.A.
J. 39 (1958) (discussing the advantages of efficient use of pretrial); Charles E. Clark,
To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454, 455 (1962) ("pleading for cau-
tion" in procedural reform); Milton Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451 (1971)
(proposing a more streamlined pretrial procedure).
60. See Shapiro, supra note 57, at 1984-86. A Virgima Circuit Court judge and
supporter of pretrial practice has noted that absent a fairly rigorous conferencing
regime, counsel allow many opportunities to simplify the case and agree on undis-
puted items to slip through their fingers:
The criticism that nothing is accomplished [at pretrial conference] which
could not be done by the attorneys themselves, is readily answered by the
observation that they probably could, but would not. Prior to pretrial con-
ferences, I can recall few instances where the attorneys agreed to stipu-
late non-controversial facts or attempted to narrow the issues. In fact, the
exact converse was true.
Elliott Marshall, Pretrial Conference: An Endorsement from the Bench, 45 VA. L. REV.
141 (1959).
61. As noted below, it is not even clear that the 1986 decisions of the Supreme
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At least today, after massive efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to
expand discovery utilization 62 and in the 1980s to improve pre-
trial conferencing, the shared and combined effects of these pro-
cedures is to channel litigation before the judge in a manner
which facilitates case management. Thus, the judge has an oppor-
tunity-indeed, under some of the federal rules a positive du-
ty-to discern the outlines of the ensuing litigation." The pow-
ers (and the obligations) of the judge to articulate default time
limitations for motions and discovery 6 compel participation by
both judges and parties in pretrial practice,65 thus depriving liti-
gants, some of whom may have incentives to delay adjudication,
of their formerly almost absolute control over the pace of prog-
ress in an action. In some instances, the judges' powers may
affect parties' freedom to file what are perceived by courts to be
dilatory motions. In turn, when judges appropriately exercise
their authority to adjudicate whole cases or issues in pretrial
practice, docket efficiency is enhanced.66
The movement toward an ethos of "managerial judging" re-
flects a number of premises about the general characteristics and
effects of pretrial practice. These premises include an increased
Court that expressly espoused summary adjudication as a legitimate weapon in the
litigation arsenal appreciably increased use of the mechanism. See infra notes 114-34
and accompanying text.
62. The 1969 revisions to the discovery rules were, as noted above, calculated to
remedy under-use of the procedures. The perceived waves of "discovery abuse," de-
fined as over-utilization of some of the procedures to the point of inposing unneces-
sary burdens on the adversary, were decried only much later. See FED. R. CIV. P
advisory committee note, reprinted in 85 F.R.D. 521, 543 (1980); AMERICAN BAR
ASs'N, SECOND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE (1980); see also Arthur L. Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Quality of
Justice: More is Less, 4 LITIG. 8 (1977).
63. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P 26(f); cf Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 478 (2d
Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that "it seems quite likely that the record at
trial will be the one now before us" on a summary judgment motion); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 378 (1982) (noting that expansion of fed-
eral pretrial procedures, such as pretrial status and discovery conferences, enables
judges to "learn more about cases much earlier than they did in the past").
64. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P 16(b).
65. See also FED. R. CIV. P 16(c) (unnumbered paragraph after subparagraph (16))
(requiring the presence of counsel who has power to enter into stipulations and per-
mitting the court in appropriate situations to require the party or a representative to
attend as well).
66. Id. rule 16 (advisory committee's notes to the 1983 amendments).
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focus on the importance of the judicial prerogative-or the
public's right to efficient court processes and a relatively
smoothly-running docket-to the extent that these factors now
weigh in the assessment of judicial and policy options. Thus,
docket delay and congestion have become concerns on a level
comparable to those of party autonomy that previously charac-
terized.the umpireal view of the judicial function." Managerial-
judging approaches also evince concern for harms caused to a
plaintiff by delay as well as those visited upon a defendant by the
pendency of claims.' In addition, there is concern that the pro-
cess of litigation itself should not be a strategic factor favoring ei-
ther the plaintiff or defendant because of the costs of delay to
overall judicial efficiency " In most jurisdictions, the present-day
form of pretrial conference procedure in particular provides op-
portunity and incentive for the termination or settlement of cases
at the earliest stages of litigation and with minimal expenditure
67. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager- The New Role
in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL L. REV. 770 (1981). For a
criticism of case management goals m pretrial procedure, see Resnik, supra note 63
(arguing that increased concern for speedy disposition in modern pretrial procedure
threatens to undermine traditional standards of impartial adjudication and judicial
review). The article by Professor Resnik provoked a running academic dialogue on the
managerial response of courts to increasing case volume and complexity. See E. Don-
ald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
306 (1986); Steven Flanders, Blind Umpres-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984) (arguing that, despite expansion of the judicial role, judges
have not abandoned any "essential attributes" by managing the pace and cost of liti-
gation); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: The Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay: The
Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGES J. 8 (1984) (arguing for careful consideration be-
fore plunging "headlong" into judicial management) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial
Judges); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering
View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudicatory Process, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 95 (1988). See generally Symposium on Litigation Management, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 305 (1986) (reviewing the development of the case management movement).
68. See FLANDERS, supra note 14, at vii (forward by the Hon. Walter E. Hoffman)
("[F]or many, defendants as well as plaintiffs, justice delayed may be justice denied
or justice mitigated in quality.").
69. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing judicial efficiency);
infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's affirmance of
judicial efficiency goal in summary judgment procedure). The increasing volume and
complexity of litigation has been cited frequently as a justification for the managerial
approach to summary judgment under Rule 56. See, e.g., Martin B. Louis, Federal
Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysts, 83 YALE L.J. 745, 752 (1974).
1995] 1649
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of judicial resources."° In sum, pretrial procedure under the Fed-
eral Rules has long been intended to promote justice and judicial
efficiency by encouraging and facilitating case management -by
judges. In recent years, mandatory scheduling systems and other
reforms have pushed the reality closer to aspirations.
C. Federal Approaches to the Summary Judgment Process
As noted above, federal judges did not universally and instan-
taneously embrace the managerial role facilitated by the panoply
of mechanisms of pretrial practice.7' Summary judgment fared
no better than other devices, and some courts erected barriers
against expansion of the motion. Rule 56, for all its innovation
and exposition of the summary judgment procedure, was not self-
implementing. Half a century passed before the Supreme Court
directed lower courts to pursue summary judgment by harmoniz-
ing the policy and language of summary judgment with the man-
agerial purpose underlying pretrial practice.72
The primary obstacle to the expansion of federal summary
judgment was a reluctance in some federal appellate circuits to
accept the idea that selective dismissal of factually defective
claims was an end to which much energy should be devoted. 3
70. Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to recognize that facilitation of settlement and
early resolution could be a goal of pretrial conference. Commentators who have ques-
tioned the managerial approach have suggested that one effect of these pretrial proce-
dures is to inject "judicial control over all phases of litigation and thus mfuse[] law-
suits with the continual presence of the judge-overseer." Resnik, supra note 63, at
379. Pretrial issue development in the context of resolving discovery issues, with an
eye towards facilitating settlement, alters the judge's role in litigation from that of
an adjudicator into that of a mediator or negotiator-and thus undermines the tradi-
tional view of judicial impartiality. Id.
71. The reporter of the Federal Rules noted with pessimism the tendency of judges
to frustrate the intended effect of procedural rules. Charles E. Clark, Special Prob-
lems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493,
498 (1950) ("Unfortunately by a kind of Gresham's Law, the bad, or harsh, proce-
dural decisions drive out the good, so that in time a rule becomes entirely obscured
by its interpretive barnacles."). Judge Clark was a proponent, as a commentator and
as a judge on the Second Circuit, for the liberal use of Rule 56 to dispose of factual-
ly deficient claims. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 927-33 (1976) (discussing Judge
Clark's role in the drafting of Rule 56).
72. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
73. Indeed, prior to 1986, many of the most "managerial" trial judges (i.e., those
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Federal trial judges could avoid reversal on summary judgment
by allowing questionable claims and defenses to go to the jury
and correcting any "wrong" verdicts during or after trial.74 Al-
ternatively, they might well have relied on the thought that most
cases settle anyway "
Judicial reluctance to utilize summary judgment found expres-
sion in restrictive constructions of Rule 56. The basic formula-
tions of the "substantive standard" for granting summary judg-
ment motions,76 which Rule 56 did not alter, and the "procedur-
al standard" (that is, the rule's mechanics and its allocation of
burdens of production) are susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions." Accordingly, courts can give either broad or narrow
readings to standards of production and sufficiency of the evi-
dence requirements, depending on judicial views of the appropri-
ateness of pretrial screening.
For example, in several celebrated cases during the 1940s, the
Second Circuit applied a rigorous substantive standard to sum-
mary judgment motions, requiring that a movant's supporting
evidence eliminate the slightest factual doubt over the movant's
entitlement to judgment. 8 The court justified the "slightest
with lughly developed senses of efficiency m the dispatch of judicial business)
shunned summary judgment. The reversal rates in appellate review of summary judg-
ment convinced many of these trial judges that the effort to pierce the pleadings and
identify controlling fact matters not subject to dispute was not worth the candle.
Louis, supra note 69, at 746; Issacharoff & Loewenstem, supra note 47, at 78. Thus,
there were judges who exercised management power by forbidding summary judgment
motions without "prior permission." There were many other judges who adopted the
practice of entering one paragraph decisions denying summary judgment motions that
had taken hundreds of pages to submit, apparently on the theory that the effort to
locate detailed factual propositions would be second-guessed on appeal.
74. FED. R. CIV. P 5(a (providing for judgment as a matter of law at various trial
and post-trial stages, encompassing former directed verdict practice and motions for
judgment non obstante veredicto, among other applications).
75. 1992 ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP., tbl. C-4, at 202.
76. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
77. See Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 (3d Cir.
1948) (holding that summary judgment must be denied if the averments are "well-
pleaded").
78. See, e.g., Arnstem v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (reversing sum-
mary judgment in a copyright infringement action);, see also Louis, supra note 69, at
760-62 (analyzing and criticizing the "slightest doubt" test).
Judge Clark, the reporter of the Federal Rules and a vocal advocate of pretrial
practice who was named to the Second Circuit bench in 1939, dissented from deci-
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doubt"79 test not by reference to the substantive standard of
Rule 56, but rather by relying on the view that judges were not
to deprive a party of a jury resolution of alleged, although as yet
unsupported, factual disputes.0 To Judge Clark and other crit-
ics, however, the test was an unwarranted restriction on the clear
imperative of Rule 56 and the policies of pretrial practice in gen-
eral.8 To these critics, the "slightest doubt" debate was, in es-
sence, an argument over the legitimacy of taking the case away
from a jury 82
The famous trilogy of Supreme Court decisions handed down
in 1986 resolved many of the questions about the effects and the
policy of Rule 56.83 In each of these cases, the Supreme Court
sions that applied the "slightest doubt" test. For a discussion of the proceedings m
Arnstein and other Second Circuit cases, see Smith, supra note 71, at 930-33;
Marcus, supra note 24, at 484; see also Douglas M. Towns, Note, Merit-Based Class
Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1020-22 (1992).
79. Beginning in the 1940s and continuing to today, the "mere scintilla" rule has
been espoused as an alternative to the "slightest doubt" test. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410
(8th Cir. 1994); Casso v. Pennsylvania R.R., 128 F. Supp. 909, 913 (W.D. Pa. 1954),
aff'd, 219 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F
Supp. 397, 450 (D.D.C. 1946), rev'd, 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
80. While admitting that in some cases a trial would be "farcical" because of over-
whelming documentary evidence, the majority in Arnstein suggested that in any fac-
tual dispute where the credibility of an affiant could be relevant "summary judgment
becomes improper and a trial indispensable." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 470-71. The court
argued that Rule 56 did not revive the equity practice, repudiated by the common
law, of "trial by affidavit." Id. at 471.
Dissenting from the decision to reverse summary judgment, Judge Clark viewed
the case as a probable strike suit by a suspect plaintiff, and thus a perfect case for
summary judgment. Id. at 478-79 (Clark, J., dissenting) (characterizing plaintiff's
allegations as "vague and reckless" and noting that plaintiff was a frequent litigator
before the court in similar copyright infringement actions).
81. See id. at 479 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("I find [it] difficult to understand
[the majority's dislike of the summary judgment rule]. [Clases, texts, and articles
without dissent accept and approve the summary judgment as an integral and useful
part of the procedural system envisaged by the rules."); see also Louis, supra note
69, at 761-62 (arguing that adoption of the "slightest doubt" test would emasculate
the summary judgment procedure).
82. The debate over summary judgment in the Second Circuit roughly comcided
with the decision of the Supreme Court in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372,
396, reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 214 (1943) (holding that a directed verdict did not de-
prive the plaintiff of his constitutional right to a jury trial in federal court).
83. The three cases involved summary judgment motions in a variety of types of
actions. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (an-
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reinstated summary judgments for defendants by overturning
restrictive circuit court interpretations of Rule 56.84 More sig-
nificantly, perhaps, all of the opinions and dissents, to varying
degrees, vouch for the legitimacy of the summary judgment mo-
tion, properly administered, as a favored method of litigation
management by judges.'
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett6 provided the most substantial and
explicit endorsement of summary judgment. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, characterized summary judgment proce-
dure "not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole."87 The Court not-
ed that Rule 56 replaced the common law pleading practice and
titrust action); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (personal injury action);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (defamation action).
It is worth noting that much of the confusion over the treatment of summary
judgment motions had been fostered by the Supreme Court's own prior opinons con-
cerinng the procedure of Rule 56. See, e.g., Mack v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Bd., 553
F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.j. 144, 159-
61 (1970)) ("A party moving for summary judgment assumes the burden of affirma-
tively demonstrating that there is no genume issue of fact on every relevant issue
raised by the pleadings even though, as a defendant, he would have no burden
if the case were to go to trial."). Celotex, m fact, reversed a decision of the D.C.
Circuit that was premised on the Adickes decision. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 318, rev'g
Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
84. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319 (holding that defendant's failure to support its motion
with evidence negating the exposure of the decedent to defendant's asbestos product
did not preclude summary judgment); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (holding that sum-
mary judgment is appropriately granted "unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmovmg party for a jury to return a verdict for that party" under the appli-
cable standard of clear and convincing proof); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-88 (holding
that nonmovmg party must come forward with persuasive evidence to support its
claim after the movant has shown that the claim is implausible).
Several post-1986 Supreme Court decisions have added important glosses on the
doctrines there announced. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1835 '(1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "the strength of factual allegations such as
subjective bad faith can be tested at the summary judgment stage"); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883-85 (1990) (finding that summary judgment
should be granted when the plaintiff fails to carry the burden of showing that he
was harmed by agency action, regardless of whether the non-moving party files affi-
davits seeking to negate elements of the non-movmg party's case).
85. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (proper focus of
Rule 56 inquiry is whether fact-finding is necessary); Towns, supra note 78, at 1020-
21, 1023-27.
86. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
87. Id. at 327.
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effectively provided the sole pretrial mechanism for dismissing
claims or defenses on the merits." Thus, the procedural burdens
of Rule 56 must be construed with due regard for parties' oppos-
ing claims and defenses and for the cost to judicial efficiency from
unnecessary trials.8 9
The Court's endorsement of summary judgment practice is
best seen in light of how summary adjudication is restricted by
the canons of construction. Summary judgment is appropriate
under Rule 56 if the moving party establishes that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that should be resolved at trial,
and hence the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Materiality is determined by the substantive law that governs the
case.9" "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment."' " Thus, fact issues on "immaterial
facts" do not preclude summary judgment.2
A dispute is genuine for summary judgment purposes only if a
"reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving par-
ty "" Thus, courts today are more willing to consider summary
judgment where little or no evidence has been adduced by the
nonmovant.94 If there is not sufficient evidence to permit a rea-
sonable jury to find for the nonmoving party on the issue, then
"a rational trier of fact would not be able to find for the
nonmoving party, and the Court should enter summary judgment
against it."95
88. Id., see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
89. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (noting that under the Federal Rules, Rule 56 is the
principal tool to avoid trials "with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public
and private resources" on factually insufficient claims or defenses); see also Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568-69 (1988) ("At least where, as here, [a) dispute centers
upon questions of law rather than fact, summary disposition proves only that the
district judge was efficient.").
90. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Quarles v. General Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Assoc., 811 F Supp. 808, 812 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
93. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
94. See, e.g., Paul v. FW. Woolworth Co., 809 F Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Del. 1992).




Another way of expressing the same test is that the trial court
is not to weigh evidence in deciding summary judgment motions.
"[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial." 6 Where there is "no evidence" to support a claim, sum-
mary judgment is appropriate.97
The prescribed approach to accepting and construing the evi-
dence also demonstrates why a party who cannot make out a
viable claim given these advantages at the time of the motion
should be thrown out of court. For example, the nonmovant's
evidence is to be taken as fact for purposes of the motion.9" In-
ferences and construction of the facts are drawn in the light most
favorable to nonmovant.99 "Ambiguities" must be resolved in
favor of the nonmovant."'0 All doubts are resolved in favor of
existence of triable issues of fact.' 0 '
Of course, some commentators have expressed fear that, even
with these safeguards, the approach embodied in Celotex confers
inordinate benefits. One aspect of Celotex's central holding was
that Rule 56 does not require a movant to provide proof suffi-
cient to negate a claim on which the opponent would bear the
burden of proof at trial.' Indeed, other comments in the
96. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. But see Towns, supra note 78, at 1024, 1027 (argu-
ing that despite the trilogy, the trial judge may and indeed must assess the "quan-
tum and quality of proof").
97. See, e.g., Harrmgton v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
98. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Boyd v. Ford Motor Co., 948 F.2d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1481 (1992); Boren v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 933 F.2d 891, 892 (10th Cir.
1991); Harrmgton v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Day v.
Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 293 (D. Colo. 1993).
100. Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991); Poulsen v. City of N.
Tonawanda, 811 F. Supp. 884, 890 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
101. Boren, 933 F.2d at 892; Day, 810 F. Supp. at 289.
102. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, did not
disagree with the Court's analysis of the operation of Rule 56. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Brennan
would have affirmed the denial of summary judgment because the movant had not
met its burden of production. Id. at 332 (arguing that, where the moving party
moves for summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no evi-
dence, the moving party must show affirmatively the absence of evidence in the re-
cord).
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Celotex opinion have been read to suggest that a movant may
discharge its procedural burden without providing any supporting
materials. °" Justices White and Brennan explicitly declined to
join in this interpretation, believing that Rule 56 should place
some affirmative duty of production upon movants. 4 This
"burden shifting" aspect of the Celotex decision has generated
criticism from some quarters. 5
The Court's 1986 trilogy of cases can be seen as an endorse-
ment of the vision of pretrial practice under the Federal Rules
that emphasizes decisive, articulated rulings. 8 Trial judges are
directed to assess the evidence as they would on a motion for
entry of judgment as a matter of law,107 based upon the avail-
able record after sufficient discovery 108 Reviewing judges are, in
103. Id. at 322-25.
104. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring); id. at 329 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 47, at 75 (arguing that the "eased
standards for bringing summary judgment motions" after the 1986 trilogy fundamen-
tally alter the balance of power between parties by increasing the costs and risks to
plaintiffs in pretrial practice while diminishing both for defendants); D. Michael
Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Su-
preme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK L. REV. 35, 38-42
(1988) (arguing that summary judgment after Celotex places unfair burdens on
nonmoving plaintiffs and interferes with the nonmoving party's constitutional right to
a jury trial); Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 334-35 (1989) (noting the especially burdensome
effects on public law litigants).
In many instances, these critics echo prior arguments against managerial pretrial
procedure, but they also raise questions about the economic and constitutional ramifi-
cations of the decision. Though it may be an overstatement to treat these arguments
as a "counter-revolution," it is true that the uncertainty of the defendant-movant's
burden after Celotex creates some potential for unfairness and inefficiency. See infra
part III.B (analyzing analogous inefficiencies under uncertain application of Virginia's
summary judgment). To the extent, however, that such arguments assert the blanket
illegitimacy of pretrial "record prediction," see Rismger, supra note 105, at 41, they
are on a collision course with federal pretrial practice, where some evaluation of the
discovery record is not only inevitable, but intentional. Where the opposing party is
on notice, however, of the requirements of the pretrial practice rules, it is hard to
see how the "record prediction" argument has any constitutional implications. See
Louis, supra note 69, at 757-58 ("[S]urely the efficacy of the summary judgment
procedure should not be emasculated because trial courts sometimes err.").
106. See Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 213-14 (arguing the proper use of summary
judgment requires thorough analysis by judge and parties and clear identification of
the issues to be decided on the motion).
107. The decisions refer to tlus as the standard for granting a directed verdict, as
the process was known prior to 1991 when the terminology of Rule 50 was changed.
108. If there is not sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find for the
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effect, encouraged by the Court's decisions not to adopt narrow
constructions of Rule 56 by erecting higher thresholds than the
text of the rule requires, such as approaches that require a trial
on the mere possibility that the pretrial record could conceivably
vary from ultimate trial evidence.1"9 Thus, trial judges are di-
rected to pursue summary judgment aggressively in the name of
efficiency," 0 and appellate judges are not to hinder this docket
management effort."' A federal district judge wrote that the
Celotex decision moved "the summary judgment procedure into
the mainstream of modern case management.""' Articulated
roughly contemporaneously with congressional reforms, judicial
and advisory group advocacy, as well as popular and academic
proposals to reduce docket inefficiencies and delay,"' this vision
of judicial roles in trial and intermediate appellate courts was an
effort by a majority of the Court to encourage active policing of
the docket, with surgical excision of cases unsupported by the
facts or on the law
The practical effect of these efforts to encourage the use of
summary adjudication at the trial level remains unclear. There is
some evidence that trial and circuit courts generally have taken
non-moving party on the issue, then "a rational trer of fact would not be able to
find for the non-moving party, and the Court should enter summary judgment
against it." Paul v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 809 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Del. 1992)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
Though the Court in Anderson was careful to state that the trial judge's task
was not to "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[,]" Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the records in Anderson and in
Celotex included factual allegations which, if developed into trial evidence, would tend
to support essential elements of the plaintiffs' claims. The above disclaimer from
Anderson notwithstanding, the opinions strongly suggest that trial judges have a duty
to evaluate a plaintiff's proof prospects from a fact-finder's point of view.
109. See supra note 105.
110. See Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 250-58 (1986) (arguing that the
trilogy is likely to increase the frequency with which courts grant summary judg-
ment).
111. See Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting Su-
preme Court's encouragement of use of summary judgment by district judges).
112. Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 213.
113. See Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 445, 445-46 (1992) (noting that Congress and the courts have grown
more receptive to popular calls for greater judicial efficiency and are more determined
to address "burdensome caseloads, docket delay, and unreasonable expense" in the
federal courts).
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the Celotex directive as a mandate for a more enthusiastic pursuit
of summary judgment."' Many decisions following Celotex re-
veal an aggressive, docket-clearing operation utilizing this aspect
of pretrial practice." 5 The number of cases regularly resolved
summarily, however, has not been the subject of significant em-
pirical research since the 1986 decisions.
Our computer research found that searchable summary judg-
ment motions.. in the federal trial court"1  have increased
from 4339 in 1985, just prior to Celotex, to 7502 in 1990 and 8078
114. Celotex has been cited in thousands of cases. A LEXIS search uncovered only
twelve cases where district judges questioned or purported to limit the views ex-
pressed by Justice Rehnquist. See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 47, at 88-91
(reviewing post-trilogy lower court decisions); Lawrence W. Pierce, Summary Judg-
ment: A Favored Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BROOK L. REV. 279,
280-81 (1987) (arguing that even prior to the trilogy, the Second Circuit was already
growing more receptive to summary judgment); Georgene Vairo, Through the Prism:
Summary Judgment and the Trilogy, in 1 RESOURCE MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND
LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, part II.F.1, at 30 (ALI-ABA 1992) (ob-
serving that circuit and district courts are responding to Celotex and are actively
encouraging summary judgment motions).
115. See Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989)
("[A] party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for
summary judgment has been made, winch contradicts his earlier deposition testimo-
ny."); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (requiring
the non-moving party to designate specific triable facts); Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp.,
811 F. Supp. 1246, 1263 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("On summary judgment, the trial
court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft
of a genuine issue of material fact"); Winters v. FDIC, 812 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Me.
1992); Parsons v. United States, 811 F. Supp. 1411, 1414 (E.D. Cal. 1992) ("The
Court is not obligated to consider matters not specifically brought to its attention.");
Gagne v. Carl Bauer Schraubenfabrick, 595. F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (D. Me. 1984) (the
court should review the summary judgment motion even if the adversary fails to
oppose it).
116. In the years before 1973, when LEXIS began service, there was no widely
available database of reported or unreported decisions, simply the West reporter sys-
tem. Since 1973, LEXIS and later Westlaw have made available decisions not official-
ly reported in the paper advance sheets and bound volumes of the reporters. The
vast majority of the summary judgment decisions found in searches in the electronic
databases either are or will be officially reported. We made no effort to determine
whether the outcomes reported in this segment of the Article would be different if
the small fraction of unreported federal decisions were excluded, or used as a data
universe itself.
117. Our perception is that almost all summary judgment motions are reported at
the trial court level, and of course attrition of those cases through the phases of the
appeal process is heavy. Hence the decision was made to confime our attention to
decisions in the federal district court databases.
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in 1993. Looking at nothing more, these numbers give the im-
pression of a significant increase in summary judgment activity
Hbwever, summary judgment issues have been raised in ever-
increasing numbers of cases from the 1950s to the present day
Taking representative years at five-year intervals, for example,
the numbers of searchable cases in which summary judgment was
raised are as follows:











Viewed in this more complete light, the trilogy of 1986 Su-
preme Court summary judgment decisions apparently does not
represent a watershed in the trend of volume for summary judg-
ment applications. Even omitting the earlier periods to avoid the
visually-jarring effect that they have on the scale, the period for
the decade prior to Celotex and the eight years since shows a
steady increase in raw numbers of cases discussing summary
judgment. Indeed, examining the year-by-year search results for
the period from 1985 to date (which includes, in effect, two base
years before Celotex became part of the popular legal culture and
the centerpiece of judicial education programs), the accessible
cases do not show a marked change in volume:
118. These figures were derived from searches m the LEXIS GENFED Library,
DIST File. The figures, for example, for the year 1985 resulted from the search:
"SUMMARY JUDGMENT" & DATE=1985.
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Clearly, the increase from 1985 to 1986, in percentage and abso-
lute terms, exceeds the annual increases for the years after
Celotex.
We attempted to determine whether the Celotex trilogy had
any appreciable impact on the percentage of summary judgment
motions granted. While hundreds of cases were read to assess
this issue, the results are offered only as an approximation.120 -
With that disclaimer, the searchable database reveals the follow-
ing percentage of motions being granted:
119. See supra note 118; infra note 120 (discussing our search methodology).
120. The procedure for estimating the proportion of cases in which a summary judg-
ment application was granted was to search for the term "summary judgment" with-
in three words of the word "granted," and to conduct a like search for the same
term within three words of the word "denied." A large number of months within the
test years were sampled on this basis. Some four-fifths of the cases in any given
month fell into one or the other of these categories. Selected months were sampled,
and it was determined by reading the full text of the opinions that 95% or more of
the cases captured by the search algorithm were correctly counted as cases m which
the motion was granted, at least in part, or denied. We did not manually review the
approximately one-fifth of the summary judgment decisions in the databases which do
not respond to the "within three words" query to allocate them; our hypothesis is
that most of those cases involve passing mention of summary judgment (as in, "de-
fendant may, if so advised, move for summary judgment") and that, in any event,
the fact that such a high proportion of the cases do use the stock terminology, espe-
cially in the decretal paragraphs at the end of the opinion (e.g., "for the foregoing
reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted/demed") means
that as a rough measure of the effect of Celotex, this technique (consistently applied
before and after 1986) should indicate whether the opinions affected the percentage
of the movants who experienced success.
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It thus appears that some increase in the movants' success rate
has taken place. Superficially, this might be said to coincide with
the period of time it took the message of Celotex (i.e., that sum-
mary judgment is legitimate) to seep into the litigation bar's
mentality Again, taking a more long-term perspective, however,
it is apparent that it could be error to place significant weight
upon these numbers. Although the absolute number of published
summary judgment decisions in the 1950s and 1960s was much
smaller (and hence the sample appear grossly affected by slight
shifts in the numbers) the percentage of summary judgment
motions granted has fluctuated significantly, reaching as high as
sixty-six percent in 1975, eleven years before Celotex, and sixty-
five percent in 1965, two decades before the trilogy-










When viewed in the long run, it does not appear that the propor-
tion of summary judgment motions granted has increased signif-
icantly, at least on the estimated basis used to sample the out-
comes.
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One final perspective on these numbers arises from the fact
that the once-inexorable growth in federal civil case filings has
abated in recent years. Celotex's call for expanded use of the
summary judgment procedure came at the peak of a steady and
dramatic increase in case filings at the district courts. Based on
figures compiled by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, 2' the raw volume of federal civil case filings has
declined somewhat in the statistical years following the summary
judgment trilogy-
FEDERAL CASE FILINGS: 1975-1992








To get a handle on the proportion of all civil cases in which the
trial court considers a summary judgment application, we com-
pared the results of the broad computer search 29 for all cases
in which summary judgment was discussed in any context (ad-
mittedly overinclusive, since it captures cases where the mecha-
nism is mentioned but such a motion is not pending) with the
reported gross volume of civil cases. This comparison suggests, at
least, that the proportion of civil cases in federal court in which
summary judgment is an issue has increased somewhat since
Celotex, as the absolute frequency of the motions has continued
its stepwise increase, but the filing volume has tapered off:
121. Figures were taken from the annual reports of 1975, 1988, 1991, and 1992.
122. Percentage increase or decrease from the prior listed year.
123. 1975 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP 208, tbl. 25.
124. 1988 ADMIN. OFF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 114, tbl. 5-8.
125. 1991 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP 138, tbl. 5-4.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 1992 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP 202, tbI. 5-4.
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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PERCENT CHANGE IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND CASE
FILINGS: 1985-1990
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISCUSSED:' CASE FILINGS:.13
YEAR: NUMBER: % CHANGE NUMBER: % CHANGE
1985 4339 - 273,670 -
1986 5566 28% 254,828 -7%
1987 5972 7% 239,185 -6%
1988 6443 8% 239,634 0%
1989 6929 8% 233,529 -3%
1990 7502 8% 217,879 -3%
Of course, it bears noting that the proportion of civil cases
resolved on summary judgment, while small in percentage terms,
should be measured in proportion to the cases that actually reach
the trial stage. In the federal system, for example, only 3.5% of
the civil cases filed reach trial.3 2 If summary judgment is grant-
ed in approximately 5,250 cases annually,33 when compared to
the 8,038 civil trials conducted annually by the federal judicia-
ry,3 this figure is significant. These figures mean that approxi-
mately as many cases are dispatched on such motions as are
actually tried. Summary judgment plays a substantial role in dis-
posing of pending matters in federal court.
D. Problems in Federal Style Summary Judgment Practice
Most states have adopted summary judgment rules modelled
after Federal Rule 56.' With so many American jurisdictions
using similar guidelines, it is appropriate to inquire whether
there are rampant problems with this model. Only a handful of
state summary judgment reform issues have surfaced in the In-
dex to Legal Periodicals in recent decades, even in the state bar
journals where one might expect to see evidence of dissatisfaction
130. See supra text accompanying note 119.
131. All figures in this column are taken from the 1991 annual report. See 1991
ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 138, tbl. 5-4.
132. 1992 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 202, tbL 5-4.
133. That is, 65% of the 8,078 decisions on such motions reported as determined by
our LEXIS research, discussed supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
134. 1992 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CMS. ANN. REP. 202, tbl. 5-4.
135. See znfra app. B.
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if generalized problems existed.' Of the few issues discussed,
many concern the adaptation of state judges and attorneys to
newly-adopted state summary judgment rules based on the fed-
eral model.'37
Federal summary judgment, on the other hand, received wide-
spread attention after Celotex and, to a lesser extent, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions.' 6 One of the principal criticisms of
the Court's 1986 summary judgment decisions argues that, rath-
er than placing too much discretion in the hands of the trial
judge, the process places too much power in the hands of a mov-
ant to launch the summary judgment inquiries "cost free." These
critics attack the uncontroversial core function of summary judg-
ment as a "gatekeeping" or screening device designed to elimi-
nate baseless claims from the judicial forum. These critiques lack
empirical validation and ignore the real world and the intersec-
tions of practice, doctrine, and intentions behind civil procedure
mechanisms.
Another criticism of the effects of the trilogy extends to the
summary judgment context Professor Resnik's concerns about
the ascendancy of case management goals and the resulting be-
havior of aggressively managerial judges. These concerns also are
misplaced: to the extent that active judicial participation in "is-
sue focusing" or "issue narrowing" in federal pretrial procedures
is a problem, blaming summary judgment places the cart before
136. For discussions of the status of summary judgment m various states, see, for
example, C. Christopher Brown, Summary Judgment in Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV.
188 (1978); Leon T. David, The Summary Judgment in California: The Case for
Judicial Reform, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 119 (1973); William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton
Lord, III, Towards a Relaxed Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court
of Chancery: A New Weapon Against "Strike" Suits, 15 DEL J. CORP L. 921 (1990);
Michael J. Martinis, Summary Judgment Procedure in Oregon: The Impact of
Oregon's Adoption of Rule 56, 13 WILLAMErIrE L. REV. 73 (1976); Richard F. McCar-
thy & Philip M. Cronin, Summary Judgment in Massachusetts, 65 MASS L. REV. 61
(1980); Robert L. Pittsford & James W. Russell, III, Comment, Summary Judgment
in Texas: A Selective Study, 14 HoUS. L. REV. 854 (1977); Rebecca Weiant, Note,
Summary Judgment on Testimonial Evidence in North Carolina, 55 N.C. L. REV. 232
(1977).
137. See, e.g., Martinis, supra note 136, at 73-75 (introducing Oregon practitioners
to the changes in state summary judgment procedure following the 1975 adoption of
a rule analogous to Rule 56).
138. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer & Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After East-
man Kodak, 154 F.R.D. 311 (1994).
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the horse. In this subsection we discuss a range of these con-
cerns, both formal and normative, and preview how aspects of
the proposed Virginia rule provide protections against the per-
ceived sources of likely abuse.
1. The "No Proof' Summary Judgment Motion
Perhaps the most strident criticisms of current federal practice
arise from anecdotal observations. On the apparent strength of a
one-month effort responding to a single summary judgment mo-
tion, for example, one observer concluded that it is too easy to
launch summary judgment motions, raising the specter of a one-
page notice of motion requiring Herculean efforts in re-
sponse."3 9
Part of the error of these critiques is the belief that review of
summary judgment papers is essentially an exercise in predictzng
what the record will be like at trial.140 On the contrary, sum-
mary judgment is a device that advances the stage of proceedings
at which the nonmoving party must meet a burden to demon-
strate some evidence on an element of its claim.141
In order to understand this point, one must disregard cases in
which the subject matter of the litigation will require proof at
trial meeting a higher-than-normal standard of proof.4 2 In most
139. See Risinger, supra note 105, at 37 & n.15.
140. Id. at 38. There are, however, no reported cases espousing a view of the sum-
mary judgment enterprise that would support the prediction metaphor. Indeed, the
only cases turned up m several LEXIS searches concerning summary judgment and
concepts with the "predict!" root that bear on the question of trial proof all hold
that prediction is not a permissible enterprise. See, e.g., Weber v. American Express
Co., 994 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, J., dissenting) ("[W]e need to recall
that a motion for summary judgment is not an opportunity for the trial court to pre-
dict winch party is going to wm or ought to win."); TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v.
American Coupon Exch., Inc., 913 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Nor are motions
for summary judgment to be used as an occasion for predicting at an early stage
what the record would eventually show if the facts were adequately developed.");
Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 901 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1990) (court win
"make no prediction as to the actual state of facts that may ultimately be estab-
lished"). Several decisions refer to the task presented on some summary judgment
motions of predicting what a state's highest court would do with an as-yet unresolved
issue of law, but that is a very different context. See, e.g., Wang v. Hsu, No. C-87-
2981, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7745 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1990).
141. See Harrngton v. Grayson, 811 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
142. See text accompanying znfra notes 430-31 (discussing the Anderson standard).
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"normal" cases, not subject to the heightened evidentiary re-
quirements of the Supreme Court's holding in Anderson v. Liber-
ty Lobby, Inc.,' the "non-weighing" approach prevails. Case
law both before and after the 1986 decisions mandates that trial
courts should not "weigh" a single witness' testimony against a
dozen witnesses' testimony proffered by the opposing party 144
If there is evidence on both sides, the balance tips in favor of the
nonmovant.4 5
Many critics of summary judgment practice fail to comprehend
that having a procedural device to identify holes in a party's
necessary proofs is a very important element in maintaining a
functional pretrial litigation system. Sanction rules notwithstand-
ing, parties commence defective claims.'46 Of course, failure to
allege a key element is grounds for dismissal under Rule 12.'
Although the proportion of federal civil cases disposed of on Rule
12 motions is small, 4 ' the motion plays an important role. The
143. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
144. For cases before 1986, see, for example, Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 863 (7th
Cir. 1985); Turrill v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 753 F.2d 1322, 1326 (5th Cir. 1985);
Dragan v. L.D. Caulk Co., 625 F. Supp. 690, 692 (D. Del. 1985) ("[Tlhe Court's func-
tion for purposes of summary judgment is not to weigh competing facts, but merely
to decide whether a factual dispute exists.").
For cases after 1986, see, for example, Aiken v. Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d
138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986) ("The district court's function at the summary judgment stage 'is not itself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genume issue for trial."')); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th
Cir. 1993).
145. See, e.g., Levy v. Chicago Police Officers, No. 90-C-2259, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2709 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 1994); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
146. A recent survey revealed that only a few judges thought Rule 11 sanctions
were very effective in deterring groundless pleadings: "These judges stated that other
methods, such as prompt rulings on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judg-
ment, Rule 16 status conferences, and warnings, were just as effective or more effec-
tive tools for managing groundless litigation." Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We
Are and Where We Are Gong, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 481 (1991) (citing E.
WIGGINS & T. WILLGING, RULE 11 JUDGE SURVEY AND FIELD STUDY PRELIMINARY RE-
PORTS § 4, at 13-14 (Federal Judicial Center 1991) (footnote omitted)).
147. FED. R. CIV. P 12.
148. Mullenlx, supra note 4, at 469 n.193 (quoting CHARLES WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 66, at 432 (4th ed. 1983) ("A sampling made in 1962 for the
information of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules suggests that such motions are
made in only about 5% of all cases, and that in fewer than 2% of all cases do such
motions lead to a final termination of the action.").
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motion for dismissal can be used early and can excise defective
claims (usually, where an element made necessary by governing
law is not pled). If the pleadings allege the necessary elements of
a viable claim, however, a motion addressing the face of the
pleadings will not lie.'
The second circumstance an effective pretrial procedure system
must address is where the pleadings aver the necessary elements,
but the plaintiff lacks evidentiary support for one or more of the
key points. This situation is the core, "gatekeeping" function of
the summary judgment motion, and even if it played no other
role, the fact that this motion provides an opportunity to screen
doomed claims would be of tremendous importance.
The critics claim that summary judgment procedure is "asym-
metrical, grossly favoring defendants over plaintiffs no matter
which party is the movant."' 5 ° In reality, because the plaintiff is
required to go forward with production of proof and meet various
burdens of persuasion, the trial is where the asymmetry is mani-
fest. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 is also asymmetrical, and
can be made fairly inexpensively by the movant. For example, if
plaintiff brings a claim which has six elements under the govern-
ing law, and the defendant recognizes that one of the elements
(e.g., notice to an employer) is not pled, the defendant's motion
may be lodged without investment of significant resources.
Indeed, in the Anglo-American tradition, stating a viable claim
is (and should remain) the pleader's burden.15' Most causes of
action have multiple elements, and a plaintiff must plead and
prevail on all of them in order to carry the day The plaintiff may
plead a detailed complaint stretching over dozens of pages, but if
the defendant can locate a single, necessary element of the claim
that the plaintiff has omitted, the motion to dismiss is appropri-
ate. ' 2 The Rule 12 motion operates to point out the defect (nor-
149. See, e.g., Duggm v. Adams, 360 S.E.2d 832, 835-36 (Va. 1987) (illustrating
treatment of the prima facia elements of a claim of tortious interference with con-
tractual relations).
150. Risinger, supra note 105, at 39.
151. Again, a motion to dismiss a counterclaim is exactly analogous, despite some
suggestion that this is msignificant. Issacharoff & Loewenstem, supra note 47, at 92.
Moreover, motions directed at specific defenses may sometimes be lodged, and a
similar logic then applies.
152. It makes no difference for this analysis whether the defect is "curable" in the
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mally at an early stage)5 on the face of the pleading.
The "no proof" summary judgment motion operates in the
same manner. Although the plaintiff has pled all of the pre-
scribed elements for a viable claim, the defendant may recognize
that there is literally "no proof" on one or more of the elements.
Whether this circumstance arises innocently 54 or as a result of
thoughtless exuberance in stating a claim when the plaintiff
should know better,'55 the function of the summary judgment
motion is to dispose of the defective claim.'56
The "no proof' summary judgment motion, therefore, acceler-
ates the time at which the party with the burden of proof at trial
must indicate that it has at least some evidence on the identified
elements. If the burden of responding is not disproportionate,5 7
it is not unfair to require this showing before trial. Even the
harshest critics of directed verdict practice admit that courts
should terminate a case in which a discrete, required element is
unproven. 5 '
Nor is the timing of the required showing unfair. The text of
the summary judgment rule embodies formally the practical reali-
sense that the plaintiff has committed a technical drafting error, and can reframe the
pleading to address the necessary points, or whether the plaintiff cannot ethically
plead the crucial matter omitted in the prior filing.
153. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P 12(h)(2) (timing of raising a plaintiffs failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted: "an objection may be made in any
pleading or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the
merits").
154. For example, where plaintiff thinks that it will be demonstrated that defendant
had notice of the events, and at the time of the commencement of the action Plain-
tiff has no access to information about defendant's internal operations. Discovery and
other investigations into the facts after commencement of the action makes it clear
that there was no such knowledge on defendant's part.
155. For example, where plaintiff herself must have taken prescribed steps to create
or preserve a claim, and a moment's study would have disclosed that the re-
quirement was not met.
156. As the Supreme Court noted in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986), "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Accord zd. at 322;
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Donaldson v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 812 F Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
157. And it is not See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943); Jack H.
Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in
Standards? 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 770 (1988).
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ty known to every litigator. The rules do not allow a movant to
rush the party with the burden of proof by requiring response
before a fair opportunity to gather proof on the identified issue.
Although Rule 56 permits a motion at any time after the parties
are fully at issue,5 9 Rule 56(f) provides an important safety
valve by noting that a party may respond to a motion by stating
the need for more exploration of the facts.' The language sug-
gests the gloss that one seeking to defer response to a pending
motion should articulate some degree of specificity in discovery
needs. Certainly, courts will be skeptical when the nonmoving
party seeks additional preparation time to respond on an issue
when that party controls the relevant facts. But the rule provides
real protection against the abuse that would attend the determi-
nation of a proffered summary judgment motion before affording
to the pleader with the burden of proof a fair opportunity to
gather facts.
2. Managerial Summary Judgment
Given Chief Justice Rehnquist's vigorous endorsement of effi-
ciency goals in federal summary judgment, it is not surprising
that some commentators have characterized the use of summary
judgment as a facet of managerial judging.'' Because case man-
agement relies on increasing the efficiency of post-pleading, pre-
trial screening and focusing mechanisms, managerial judging
would be impossible without something resembling the summary
judgment device." 2 The existence of a summary judgment de-
159. See FED. R. CIV. P 56(a).
160. Id. rule 56(f).
161. See sources cited supra note 67; see also Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note
47, at 89 (citing "evidence in the post-trilogy case law that summary judgment
has been transformed into a mechanism to assess plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing at
trial" by weighing the available evidence); Schwarzer, supra note 51 (Celotex moving
summary judgment into modern case management); Stempel, supra note 67, at 96-99
(tymg case management trend to the Supreme Court trilogy). But ef Paul Carrmgton,
The Reporters Speak- Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions:
An Exorcism of the Body of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2092 (1989) (viewing summary judgment "as an alternative both to
sanctions and to managerial judging," in which summary judgment provides more ac-
countability for the dispositive impact decisions made by a trial judge owing, appar-
ently, to the likelihood of a reported and appealable disposition).
162. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 67, at 402 n.115 (citing cases where
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vice is an intrinsic force, shaping the incentives of parties in
pretrial maneuvering. Nevertheless, utilization of the device as a
management tool is dependent on a myriad of other incentives
and assessments. Regardless of the imperative for efficiency,
parties and judges make many choices in deciding how to pursue
pretrial procedure which in turn define the function of summary
judgment.
Initially, summary judgment practice is initiated by the par-
ties.16 The one aspect of federal practice almost wholly within
judicial prerogative is the power of the trial court to make factual
findings even when the motion process does not lead to entry of a
judgment.' Very few cases undertake fact finding after an un-
successful effort at summary judgment, and this lack of cases is
perhaps the strongest evidence that judges do not use summary
judgment as a managerial tool. Rule 56 expressly authorizes the
trial judge to salvage some utility from the parties' effort, and
her own, in assessing a case on summary judgment, but only
where full or partial summary judgment may not be entered."
In the theory of Rule 56, the court is free to make detailed factu-
al findings of those matters which the parties do not dispute,
even though they fail to amount to sufficient elements warrant-
ing entry of judgment as a matter of law on a claim or de-
fense. 16
6
managerial judges justified the entry of summary judgments on efficiency grounds).
163. See supra note 48 (discussing power of federal courts to enter summary judg-
ment sua sponte). There are, however, almost no reported cases where summary
judgment was entered without a motion by one of the parties. See generally Shapiro,
supra note 57, at 1982 n.45 (collecting three reported cases which asserted that the
court could summarily dismiss claims without a party-initiated summary judgment
motion).
Of course, given that Rule 16 now provides for discussion of the elimination of
frivolous claims during pretrial conferences, a judge may be able to ignore the inqui-
ry and precipitate a discussion at which the prospective motion victor is encouraged
to go forward with what is, in perspective, an invited motion. See FED. R. CIV. P 16.
164. On the face of the rule, engaging in such fact finding is a duty: the court
"shall if practicable" determine material facts not subject to dispute. FED. R. CIV. P
56(d).
165. Id.
166. Indeed, commentators have argued on efficiency grounds that Rule 56 should
be amended to change its focus from the disposition of entire claims to the pretrial
adjudication of specific facts. E.g., DAVID S. HERR ET AL, MOTION PRACTICE 446-48
(1991).
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A truly managerial judge would undertake Rule 56(d) practice
in nearly all cases, so that proof issues preserved for adjudication
might be streamlined.1 67 In fact, however, it is almost never un-
dertaken.' State reaction similarly appears to ignore this pos-
sible source of direction and control of the future course of a
case.169 The relative lack of utilization of the "issue focusing"
judicial function in Rule 56 suggests that the fears of overween-
ing managerial judging are misplaced in the summary judgment
context. °
Observation of the behavior of some of the most "managerial"
courts also shows how managerial theory can conflict with sum-
mary judgment reality The principal management tools employed
by aggressively managerial courts are time deadlines and staging
directions that require a specific sequence of preparation
steps.' In some courts, this approach takes a distinctly hostile
flavor vis-a-vis motion practice. For example, in the Southern
District of New York, one of the most hectic litigation centers in
the federal system 72 and a court known for active judicial man-
agement, several judges have subscribed to local rules,' 7 or "1o-
167. See Elliott, supra note 67, at 322 ("[Managenal judging was a response to a
perceived need by judges to narrow issues if litigation was to be processed in a rea-
sonably efficient fashion.").
168. While documenting this observation requires inferential use of support, it is
perhaps sufficient to note that the number of reported cases reciting the use of facts
found under Rule 56(d) is fewer than 250.
169. In Virginia, objections to the possibility of such "rampant" fact finding caused
the draft rule on summary judgment to be re-written in 1993. At the Boyd-Graves
conference in October 1992, strident opposition was voiced to the possibility that trial
judges, not subject to an effective right of appeal in Virginia, would be empowered to
"find facts" on the motion stage of the process. Since the disuse of the Rule 56(d)
model was well known, the drafters of the proposed Virguna rule deleted the mecha-
nism for such fact-finding from the discussion drafts in order to avoid needless con-
troversy over insignificant aspects of the summary judgment process.
170. Of course, the lack of reported opinions does not eliminate the possibility that
judges wield the power to shape the issues during pretrial conferences. See Resnik,
Managerial Judges, supra note 67, at 400-02 n.115 (envisioning judicial coercion to
settle cases through unreviewable "pre-decisions" communicated to counsel at pretrial
conferences).
171. See Dayton, supra note 113, at 455.
172. For example, in a recent study, the Southern District of New York had almost
50% of all cases terminated by visiting judges and one of the highest weighted civil
filings per judgeship. 1992 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP tbls. V-1, X-IA.
173. S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 3(1).
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cal, local rules,"'74 forbidding the filing of motions without first
"applying for" a "pre-motion conference" and obtaining at such a
session leave by the grace of the presiding judge to burden the
court with the filing of a dispositive motion.'
Why would aggressive, management-oriented judges seek to
avoid motion practice, especially post-Celotex? In part, the atti-
tude may spring from a sense that defense counsel in major com-
mercial cases may engage in summary judgment motion practice
with blissful apathy about whether the practice has much chance
of disposing of the case. 7 Whether the thoughtless filing of ma-
jor motions is undertaken in any appreciable proportion of the
cases on the docket simply to achieve delay (while the motion is
pending) or to burden the adversary (with the costs and effort of
response) remains to be determined by statistical study Nothing
in the burgeoning sanction literature suggests that commence-
ment of specious summary judgment motions is a prevalent prob-lem. 77
But in busy courts, particularly those of the federal system-in
which the demands of the criminal case docket under the Speedy
Trial Act'.. are such that most working days are devoted to
criminal, not civil, casesl79-may be forgiven for feeling that
they have literally "no time to waste" on motions that may not
directly resolve the civil case.
A second reason why summary judgment may not be viewed as
an effective management tool for trial courts is that the parties
know better than the courts whether the evidence warrants a
summary judgment motion. Modern courts do not require the
174. See N.Y. L.J., May 31, 1994, at 45-46 (setting forth myriad provisions that
individual judges impose for motion procedural requirements).
175. Nine of tilrty-six judges in the Southern District of New York require a pre-
motion conference for at least some motions. Id.
176. The high reversal rates for summary judgments which existed prior to Celotex
actually made it more likely that the preemptive motion would be used strategically
rather than substantively to narrow or eliminate claims before trial. However, post-
Celotex, "[ilt is in the moving party's interest to ensure that adequate time (for dis-
covery by the parties] is provided." Schwarzer, supra note 51, at 221.
177. See generally GREGORY P JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGA-
TION ABUSE (1989); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPEC-
TIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES (1990).
178. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (1988).
179. 1992 ADMIN. OFF U.S. CTS. ANN. REP 71.
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regular filing of discovery fruits in most instances, 18° and, even
where transcripts and interrogatory answers are lodged, the
documents produced under Rule 34 are not.18' Most important-
ly, trial judges do not routinely read the documents that are filed
(or have a law clerk do so) in an effort to find a defect in a claim
or defense that begs for summary adjudication.
Thus, whether the evidence is such that a summary judgment
motion should be filed is almost exclusively a matter of attorney
judgment because only the attorneys have a grasp of the plethora
of facts during most of the pretrial preparation stages. Of course,
on occasion a judge (perhaps, through detailed grappling with
discovery disputes) comes to recognize that there is a narrow
proof issue on which some or all of the case turns, and the party
favored by the apparent state of the record may express or signal
to the court that its adversary simply lacks the wherewithal to
establish its claim or defense.
Summary judgment as a procedure always has rested uncom-
fortably in the context of managerial judging. There is a differ-
ence between the availability of a robust summary judgment
mechanism as a legitimate screening or gatekeeping device to
streamline a heavy litigation docket load and the concept of sum-
mary judgment as an issue-focusing, management tool. 8" Sum-
mary judgment can play an important role in weeding out cases
that are not viable. The capacity of this motion to eliminate a
segment of the caseload, however, is not the equivalent of demon-
strating that the motion is an efficient management technique.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VIRGINIA PRACTICE
Modern procedural systems provide devices for reviewing pend-
ing civil cases at each stage of the law suit. The principal vantage
points from which case sufficiency is assessed in modern legal
systems begin immediately after the filing of the suit-when a
motion to dismiss (in Virginia practice a demurrer) may be filed
180. See FED. R. CIV. P 5(d) (court may direct non-filing of discovery fruits).
181. See zd. rule 34.
182. See Flanders, supra note 67, at 507 (cautioning against the confusion of gen-
umely questionable judicial approaches to case management with "established [pretri-
al] practices that are generally recognized as acceptable and even essential").
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to challenge the sufficiency of the averments in the charging
pleading. During the pretrial phases, summary judgment is the
principal mechanism by which baseless cases may be stricken
from the docket. During trial, a motion for judgment as a matter
of law (in Virginia, the motion to strike followed by a motion for
summary judgment) allows for dismissal of the case after the
plaintiff has had an opportunity to present proof in the trial fo-
rum. These three mechanisms are broadly available in the state
court systems... and i the federal courts. Each has a distinc-
tive office.
A. Context: Pleading and Demurrer Practzce zn Virginza
The motion to dismiss entails a review of legal and factual
sufficiency, although the former predominates in important ways.
These attacks on the facial sufficiency of the plaintiff's pleading
are reviewed under familiar principles. All of the averments in
the pleading are treated as true for purposes of the review;"
not only are facts expressly asserted in the pleading taken as
true, but reasonable inferences springing from those facts are
accepted for the purposes of the dismissal review 185
Most motions to dismiss and demurrers challenge the legal
sufficiency of plaintiff's pleading.'88 Factual review is confined
to the facts alleged,'87 and the demurrer is deemed to be an
admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of the facts
asserted.'88 The court may review any exhibit attached to, or
mentioned in, the pleading.'89 The facts thus amassed are con-
183. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules zn State
Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367
(1986).
184. See Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 208 (Va. 1994) (citing CaterCorp,
Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 277, 279 (Va. 1993)).
185. See CaterCorp, 431 S.E.2d at 279; Rosillo v. Winters, 367 S.E.2d 717, 717 (Va.
1988).
186. See, e.g., Luckett v. Jennings, 435 S.E.2d 400, 402 (Va. 1993) ("[A] demurrer
tests only the legal sufficiency of a pleading, not matters of proof.") (citations omit-
ted).
187. Van Deusen, 441 S.E.2d at 208; Elliott v. Shore Stop, Inc., 384 S.E.2d 752, 753
(Va. 1989).
188. CaterCorp, 431 S.E.2d at 279 (citing Rosillo, 367 S.E.2d at 717).
189. Reistroffer v. Person, 439 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Va. 1994); see Fun v. Virginia Mili-
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strued in the light most favorable to the party whose pleading is
attacked.190 Typically, the question is whether the prescribed
elements of a cause of action found in the prevailing law of the
jurisdiction are included in the averments of the pleading.'9 '
The necessary elements for the cause of action might be recited
in decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia for common law
causes of action, and either in such decisions or in the statute for
statutory claims. The dominant modality of motions to dismiss
and demurrer practice, therefore, is the review of pleading para-
graphs to look for allegations that touch upon each of the ele-
ments necessary to state a viable claim under the applicable
law 192 Frequently, even conclusory allegations will suffice. 9 z
To a lesser extent, demurrer practice in Virginia reviews fac-
tual matters. As noted above, the facts asserted in the plaintiffs
pleading are taken to be true for the purposes of the demurrer,
and whether those facts will actually be proven is not properly
measured at that stage of proceedings.' Further, the doctrine
of accepting reasonable inferences from the facts as true for pur-
poses of the demurrer, while rarely evidenced in practice in any
important respect, is routinely recited and serves the formalistic
function of directing attention away from evaluating the under-
lying reality 195 Instead, the trial court is directed to assume the
facts favorable to the plaintiff pleader,'96 reducing the question
on the demurrer to whether all of those assumed factual proposi-
tary Inst., 427 S.E.2d 181, 181 (Va. 1993); Flippo v. F&L Land Co., 400 S.E.2d 156,
156 (Va. 1991) (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:4(i)).
190. Goode v. Burke Town Plaza, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Va. 1993) (citing Beach
v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 367 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1988)),
191. See generally Cox Cable, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 410 S.E.2d 652, 656 (Va.
1991); Hop-In Food Stores, Inc. v. Serv-N-Save, Inc., 375 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Va. 1989);
Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (Va. 1977).
192. See, e.g., CaterCorp, 431 S.E.2d at 279-82.
193. See, e.g., Nedrich v. Jones, 429 S.E.2d 201, 204-07 (Va. 1993).
194. As the court stated in CaterCorp, "[w)hen a motion for judgment or a bill of
complaint contains sufficient allegations of material facts to inform a defendant of
the nature and character of the claim, it is unnecessary for the pleader to descend
into statements giving details of proof in order to withstand demurrer." 431 S.E.2d
at 279 (citing Hunter v. Burroughts, 96 S.E. 360, 365 (Va. 1918)).
195. See, e.g., CaterCorp, 431 S.E.2d at 279.
196. See, e.g., United Leasing Corp. v. Thrift Ins. Corp., 440 S.E.2d 902, 903 (Va.
1994).
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tions would be sufficient to address the necessary elements of the
claim.
As a result, an experienced pleader who does competent legal
research into the governing law has little excuse for failing to
draft a pleading that will withstand a demurrer. Indeed, one
sanction decision decided by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1993
supports the proposition that, at some point, the failure to plead
the obvious and required elements for a claim under Virginia law,
necessitating demurrer and motion practice, can subject the
pleader to monetary sanctions."'
One might expect, of course, that the development of sanctions
jurisprudence in Virginia would need to be taken into account in
assessing the role of a demurrer. After its enactment in 1987,
Virginia Code section 8.01-271.118 has gradually become part of
the legal culture in Virginia. It remains, however, a lightly used
provision. While in federal practice thousands of decisions discuss
the comparable provisions of Federal Rule 11, and full-length
treatises catalog the thick body of law being developed to imple-
ment Rule 11,1'9 in Virginia there are only a half-dozen report-
ed sanction decisions by the supreme court" ° and only a small
number of sanction decisions reported at the trial court level. In
the most recent calendar year for which statistics are available,
out of 105,962 circuit court civil dispositions, 0 1 only six report-
ed cases granted sanctions.0 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia deftly has selected for appellate
review a collection of key subjects within the law of sanctions.
Claims lacking in legal basis clearly may be the subject of sanc-
tions under section 8.01-271.1.29" The court also has specified
197. The court approved multiple $3,500 sanctions where a motion for judgment
asserted clais for which necessary elements were lacking. Nedrich, 429 S.E.2d at
207.
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Miclue 1993).
199. See, e.g., VAIRO, supra note 177, at Supp. 1991; JOSEPH, supra note 177.
200. See, e.g., Nedrzch, 429 S.E.2d at 201; Oxenham v. Johnson, 402 S.E.2d 1 (Va.
1991); County of Prince William v. Rau, 391 S.E.2d 290 (Va. 1990); Tullidge v. Board
of Supervisors, 391 S.E.2d 288 (Va. 1990).
201. JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW, VIRGINIA STATE OF THE JUDICIARY REPORT 1992,
at A-49 (hereinafter JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW 1992].
202. This figure was calculated from 1992 decisions reported and indexed m volumes
27-29 of the Virginia Circuit Court opinions.
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Michie 1993); see Tuilidge, 391 S.E.2d at 289-90
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that pleading claims for which the factual predicate has not been
explored adequately, and which later proves to be lacking, may
also be the basis for sanctions in Virginia. °4
Arguably, the one-sided factual assumptions made in demurrer
practice, which accord full sway to the factual averments in the
pleading and, indeed, also credit implied facts flowing from those
expressly stated, are not without bounds. Under this view, a
pleader whose legal skills exceed his ethical compunctions would
not be free to pepper a motion for judgment with artificial facts
set forth simply to cover the elements needed to state a cause of
action. Averring those facts without the good faith basis required
by the pleading rules. 5 and the sanction statute would be im-
proper.
One hopes the sanction rules have this effect. Certainly, the
cries from some segments of the bar and some academic commen-
tators about the fear of "chilling" advocacy in marginal cases, as
a result of the specter of sanction proceedings, suggests that at
least some members of the litigation community perceive that
some deterrence may result from the heightened scrutiny of a
pleading's factual basis.0 8
It appears to us, however, that the combination of demurrer
practice and sanction rules is not sufficient to assure that cases
reaching the extended pretrial phase of civil litigation routinely
have factual support for all of the points necessary to sustain a
(not imposmg sanctions).
204. Oxenham, 402 S.E.2d at 4 (imposing sanctions).
205. See VA. SUP CT. R. 1:4.
206. See, e.g., Gregory P Joseph, The Trouble with Rule 11, 73 A.B.A. J. 87, 88
(1987); Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1313 (1986); Jean M. Snyder, The Chill of Rule 11, 11 LITIG. 16 (1985); Carl
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 (1989); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analyszs,
118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Paul Kaufman, Note, A Prospective Cap on Rule 11 Sanctions,
56 BROOK L. REV. 1275, 1276 (1991); see also VAIRO, supra note 177 (collecting
articles critical of Rule 11); cf. Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubt-
ful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule
11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023,
1053-54 (1989) (making the argument that Rule 11 had been at least substantially
successful).
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cause of action. The major reason for this insufficiency is that
Virginia, like most modern jurisdictions, relies on a version of the
notice pleading doctrine. In the run-of-the-mill case it is not
necessary to aver "evidentiary detail" in the plaintiffs initial
pleading." 7 For some subject matters, such as negligence, Vir-
ginia law permits a plaintiff to plead "generally," which results in
highly opaque averments that are deemed sufficient as a matter
of law 20. Although available techniques allow the defendant to
elicit the more precise contours of the facts alleged in support of
these general averments (e.g., bill of particulars practice). 9 few
contend that these devices seamlessly elucidate the factual lacu-
nae in plaintiffs' pleadings.
Nor is the problem necessarily reflective of dilatory practice on
the part of plaintiffs. In many instances a plaintiff will have some
ethical, good faith basis for making averments about factual
issues when the necessary information rests in the hands of the
defendant. Internal processes or actions of a corporate defendant
are one common arena where this situation obtains. Averments
of a defendant's intent are also beyond the plaintiffs knowledge.
The plaintiff may have a sufficient basis for inferring intent in
the actions of third parties, satisfying the pleader that a non-
sanctionable factual averment properly can be set forth.
In these instances, neither the facial review of a demurrer nor
the possibility of looming sanctions will deter a plaintiff from
making the factual allegations necessary to state a viable claim.
The face of the pleading will thus be sufficient to withstand the
test of a demurrer, and the case will proceed into the preparation
stage. In some jurisdictions, the court may review the case at this
stage after a motion for summary judgment.
B. Summary Judgment in Virginia Today: Hobbled at Best
Summary judgment practice is almost nonexistent in Virginia.
Of the several thousand Virginia trial court decisions reported,
only forty resulted in pretrial summary judgment disposi-
207. CaterCorp v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 277, 279 (Va. 1993).
208. See VA. SUP CT. R. 3:16 (stating that negligence may be pled generally, sub-
ject to amplification by a bill of particulars if the court so orders).
209. See id. rule 3:16(b)-(c).
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tions.21° During the last twenty years, two million trial court
dispositions were rendered in Virginia;21' only fifty-three sum-
mary judgment decisions reached appellate review 212
We sought to compare the reported rulings on pretrial sum-
mary judgment motions in Virginia to a statistical analysis of the
federal system. 213 In 1977, William P McLauchlan sampled 535
reported federal cases, including 215 appellate and 320 trial court
decisions, from 1938 to 1968.214 The Virginia summary judg-
ment cases from 1954 to 1994 total ninety-three reported cases:
forty circuit court opinions and fifty-three decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia.215 Despite the variance in the sample
size, we believe that the comparison is a useful way to study the
evident restrictiveness of the Virginia summary judgment.216
210. Trial court decisions in Virginia are not officially reported, but are collected
systematically in Va. Cir. Ct. Opinions (Butterworth 1993).
We offer the numbers recited in the text not as a claim of the absolute frequen-
cy of summary adjudication, but on the premise that the proportion of reported trial
court decisions in which summary judgment figures is indicative of summary disposi-
tion in the larger body of unreported dispositions as well. Indeed, one could argue
that there is a greater likelihood that cases interdicted pretrial with summary judg-
ment would find their way into the volumes of reports, and hence the number of
unreported decisions in which summary judgment is involved would be proportionate-
ly less.
211. Virginia's circuit courts are closing over 100,000 civil cases per year. See
JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REvIEv 1992, supra note 201, at A-47, tbl. 10. In the last ten
statistical years, for example, over one million civil cases were filed in the circuit
courts alone. Id.
212. Results of LEXIS and Westlaw searches, January, 1994. Mid-trial entry of judg-
ment, which would be called a directed verdict in most systems, has been labelled
summary judgment in several periods of Virginia legal history; these post-evidentiary
dispositions have been excluded in the tabulation, which focuses on pretrial summary
judgment in the form discussed throughout this Article.
213. See William P McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judg-
ment Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1977).
214. Id. at 435.
215. Tabulations on file with the author. These cases were gathered from a LEXIS
search and from published citations. The summary judgment decisions make up a
very small portion of the reported cases since 1954: less than 0.5% of the circuit
court opinions and less than 1% of the supreme court opiions. There were no sum-
mary judgment decisions in the Virginia Court of Appeals Reports index.
216. The Virginia cases are probably not statistically sufficient to generalize about
Virginia summary judgment in isolation. See, e.g., McLauchlan, supra note 213, at
442 n.65 (criticizing a commentator's conclusions regarding the success rate of federal
summary judgment motions due to the insufficiency of the commentator's sample).
However, the dramatic difference between the Virginia and federal rates of success,
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WIN RATIOS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CATEGORIZED BY WHICH
PARTY MOVED
Movant: Virginia: Federal:217
Plaintiff 35%218  62.9%
Defendant 34% 73.9%
Total 34% 70.9%
A comparison of win ratios indicates that a summary judgment
motion is twice as likely to be granted (and subsequently sus-
tained if appealed) in the federal courts than in the Virginia
courts. 219 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed trial judges
in 68% of the appellate cases, compared to a 49.6% reversal rate
in the federal sample.22 ° Plaintiffs and defendants moved for
discussed above, cannot be accounted for by the probability of error resulting from
unreported decisions; therefore, the data can support our comparative conclusions.
217. McLauchlan, supra note 213, at 443.
218. In our study, we have designated as plaintiffs those parties which asserted the
claim or defense adjudicated in the motion. That is, in four cases we reconfigured the
parties to reflect their true position in counterclaims and affirmative defenses: three
times "plaintiffs" were redesignated defendants, and one "defendant" was numbered
among the plaintiffs. Though McLauchlan does not state whether he reconfigured
parties in a similar fashion, we believe that this is a more accurate way to reflect
the reality of the cases. The possible variance does not, of course, affect the overall
success rates.
219. It is true that, as McLauchlan noted, the study of the reported cases does not
account for unreported rulings from trial courts. See McLauchlan, supra note 213, at
435. McLauchlan also conducted a docket study from an llinois district court that
showed some differences from the reported case sample. Id. at 449-56. The general
success rates of parties making the motion, however, was consistent with the report-
ed case sample. Id. at 450. One dramatic difference occurred in the success rates for
plaintiffs: 62.8% in the reported case sample and 24% in the docket study. Id. at
453. This result is unsurprising, as a plaintiff whose motion for summary judgment
has been demed may proceed to trial or settlement. Id. A subsequent verdict against
that plaintiff usually confirms the trial judge's judgment that genuine issues existed.
In contrast, a verdict for the plaintiff will foreclose an appeal of the trial judge's
demal.
220. See McLauchlan, supra note 213, at 449. All but three of the thirty-six Vir-
gima reversals reversed the granting of a summary judgment and remanded for trial.
The other three were cases where the Supreme Court of Virginia could enter judg-
ments for the nonmovmg parties on the appeal record. See Bristol Sch. Bd. v.
Quarles, 366 S.E.2d 82, 90 (Va. 1988) (finding sufficient facts to support admunstra-
tive removal of state employee after reversing trial court's injunction of proceedings
on due process grounds); White v. Blue Cross, 212 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Va. 1975) (ambigu-
ity of insurance contract mandates a finding effectuating coverage for plaintiff); Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 194 S.E.2d 699, 702-03 (Va. 1973) (entering summa-
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summary judgment in roughly the same proportion in both sets
of data. 2' Finally, although isolated generalizations from the
Virginia cases are statistically suspect,222 the Virginia decisions
do not tend toward any greater success rate over the period stud-
ied; in fact, the success rate is higher in the older cases-those
before 1980-than the subsequent cases.22 Further reliance up-
on comparisons with the McLauchlan results is probably not
useful due to the size of subsamples involved. 4
These comparisons 25 lead to a number of duly qualified ob-
servations. Successful use of summary judgment in Virginia is
rare relative to that in the federal courts. A party who appears to
merit a speedy resolution of her liability or claim will find sum-
mary judgment an inefficient vehicle. Because the party would
seek to avoid further delay of the case, she should wisely recon-
sider filing a summary judgment motion, even if she suspects
that the outcome at trial is a foregone conclusion. The paucity of
reported summary judgment cases in Virginia suggests that the
motion is not often made.22 Whether the chicken or the egg
came first, the evidence tends to reinforce the widely-held per-
ception that the summary judgment motion is not very effective
and that the motion is not frequently utilized.
Comparative statistics on the frequency of summary disposi-
tions nationally are not available, but as described above, the
Virginia procedural system's capacity to screen out baseless
ry judgment on defendant's motion after resolving narrow statutory issue against
successful moving plaintiff).
221. In the federal sample, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in 21.7% of the
cases, defendants in 58.1%, and both parties in 16.3%. McLauchlan, supra note 213,
at 442. In the Virginia sample, plaintiffs filed the motion in 25% of the cases, defen-
dants in 67%, and both in 9%.
222. See supra note 210.
223. The success rate in pre-1980 Virginia reports was 41%, or 16 out of 27 cases.
The post-1979 success rate was 31%, or 18 out of 26. The district court cases were
excluded from this sample due to the insufficiency of pre-1980 reported cases.
224. McLauchlan breaks down Ins sample into subclasses determmed by types of
action, by the use of supporting materials, and other distinguishing factors. See
McLauchlan, supra note 213, at 438-41. Unfortunately, our sample becomes meaning-
less at such a scale. For example, we found no Virginia summary judgment cases
which could be classified as "real property" cases.
225. See supra notes 210-24 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 215.
1995] 1681
1682 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1633
claims is feeble by any measure. Five key factors make tummary
judgment under the current Virginia rules ineffectual.227 These
factors are: (1) the doctrine that averments in the pleadings can
preclude summary judgment, (2) the lack of express authority for
the use of affidavits on summary judgement, (3) the lack of ex-
press authority for the use of other sources of proof on summary
judgment, (4) the statute and rule barring the use of deposition
testimony on summary judgment, and (5) the governing rule's
absence of a procedural roadmap that could aid the court and the
parties in formulating summary judgment issues. Each of these
problem areas is discussed in turn.
1. Pleading Allegations and the "Duty" to Present Evidence
While some national commentators have lamented the alleged
ease with which the federal system gives rise to an obligation on
plaintiff's part to make this showing,22 no community of opin-
ion doubts that after a proper showing by the movant, the plain-
tiff in some cases should be required to demon-
strate-pretrial-the existence of at least some admissible evi-
227. Rule 3:18 now provides:
Either party may make a motion for summary judgment at any time
after the parties are at issue. If it appears from the pleadings, the orders,
if any, made at a pretrial conference, the admissions, if any, in the pro-
ceedings, or, upon sustaining a motion to strike the evidence, that the
moving party is entitled to judgment, the court shall enter judgment in
his favor. Summary judgment, interlocutory in nature, may be entered as
to the undisputed portion of a contested claim or on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Summary judgment shall not be entered if any material fact is genuinely
m dispute. No motion for summary judgment or to strike the evidence
shall be sustained when based in whole or in part upon any discovery
depositions under Rule 4:5, unless all parties to the action shall agree
that such deposition may be so used.
VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18. Rule 2:21 contains an introductory limitation barring use of
summary judgment m suits for divorce or annulment, but is otherwise identical to
Rule 3:18. See id. rule 2:21. Efforts to inaugurate a Family Court in Virginia are
underway as this Article goes to press. This development will affect the appropriate-
ness of the domestic relations exemption. This Article proposes that if dual summary
judgment provisions remain in the Rules of the Supreme Court, both rules should be
amended in a similar fashion. For ease of reference, we hereinafter refer to the two
provisions as a unitary Virginia "rule."
228. See sources cited supra note 105.
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dence for each required element of the claim. If the review of
summary judgment applications does not require the plaintiff to
document the means by which facts will be proven, little differ-
entiates summary judgment from demurrer practice. In Virginia,
plaintiffs are spared the obligation to respond on the merits if the
averments in the motion for judgment state a proposition counter
to the focus of the summary judgment motion on their face. 29
The federal court system recognized this problem in 1963. An
amendment to Federal Rule 56 redressed the case law that had
created the right of a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment by
relying on the averments in the complaint.Y Many state court
procedural systems have similarly amended their summary
judgment rule to obviate this maneuver.23 ' Unless interdicted
by rules revisions, the older case law doctrine effectively prevents
summary judgment by reducing the practice to a motion to dis-
miss device in which the facial completeness of the charging
pleading will be sufficient to preclude pretrial screening for un-
provable cases.
As in other jurisdictions, Virginia case law has developed to
allow plaintiffs to rely on averments in their own motions for
judgment to defeat defendants' summary judgment applica-
tions.3 2 In several cases, the Virginia Supreme Court has held
the denial in the responsive pleading suffices to bar summary
judgment. 23 Thus, the court has held that a party expressly
denying a point in its answer "created an issue of fact which
made summary judgment inappropriate."234 Another decision
found summary judgment improper where a party reiterated its
229. See infra notes 232-54 and accompanying text.
230. See Advisory Committee's Note, 1963 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 31 F.R.D. 647 (1963). The Advisory Committee commentary which
accompanied tlus reform indicated that the goal "of the summary judgment procedure
is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof m order to see whether there is a
genuine need for trial." Id. at 648.
231. See, e.g., Alabama ex. rel. Baxley v. Givhan, 297 So. 2d 357, 360 (Ala. 1974);
Lesnik v. Estate of Lesnik, 403 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Ocean Cape
Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 164 A.2d 607, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1960).
232. See McNew v. Dunn, 353 S.E.2d 713 (Va. 1987).
233. See, e.g., id. at 716; George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros., 255
S.E.2d 682, 684 (Va. 1979).
234. Piland Corp. v. League Constr. Co., 380 S.E.2d 652, 653 (Va. 1989) (citing
Kasco Mills Inc. v. Ferebee, 90 S.E.2d 866, 870 (Va. 1956)).
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denial from the answer in response to a request for admis-
sions.235 The court in that case indicated that the factual ques-
tion "was drawn in issue" by this sequence of answer and refusal
to admit."' By implication, the state of the case law and rules
in Virginia imposed no duty on the defendant to set forth a basis
for the denial." 7 Conversely, at least one decision suggests that
the plaintiff's charges precluded summary judgment even when
they had been denied in the answer, and all discovery had con-
firmed that denial was correct.3 8
Thus, Virginia courts have described plaintiff as under "no du-
ty" at the pretrial stage to fully develop evidentiary support for
an essential allegation of his claim.3 9 The "no duty" formula-
tion figured prominently in a pair of 1974 tort cases.24° In
Owens v. Redd, the plaintiff sued a supermarket, a soft drink
bottler, and a beverage distributor for injuries suffered when a
bottle of cola fell and exploded in the store.24' In her pleading,
the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer and distributor had
negligently stacked the bottles on an unsafe rack and that this
negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries.242 Based on
plaintiff's deposition testimony,243  the trial court entered
summary judgment for the manufacturer and distributor on the
ground that the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was
the negligence of an unidentified man who knocked the bottle
from the rack.244 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, find-
ing that the plaintiff was under no duty to fully develop her alle-
235. Stone v. Alley, 392 S.E.2d 486, 486 (Va. 1990).
236. Id. at 486.
237. See O'Brien v. Snow, 210 S.E.2d 165, 167 (Va. 1974); Owens v. Redd, 205
S.E.2d 669, 671 (Va. 1974).
238. Winslow, Inc. v. Scaife, 299 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Va. 1983). The court did note
that some key documents were not before the court, although a number of others
had been submitted. Id.
239. O'Brien, 210 S.E.2d at 167; Owens, 205 S.E.2d at 671.
240. O'Brien, 210 S.E.2d at 167; Owens, 205 S.E.2d at 671.
241. Owens, 205 S.E.2d at 670.
242. Id. at 670-71.
243. The case occurred shortly before the Virginia legislature banned the use of
depositions for summary judgment motions without the agreement of the parties. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420 (Miclue 1992).
244. Owens, 205 S.E.2d at 670.
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gations of negligence and proximate cause."'
The Owens formulation of the "no duty" rule may have been
unnecessarily broad. Without comment, the court noted the exis-
tence of evidence in the record that could support an inference of
the defendants' negligence.246 However, the court based its re-
versal on the defendants' inability to negate an essential allega-
tion of the plaintiff's claim-an element for which the plaintiff
would have the burden of production and proof at trial.247
In O'Brien v. Snow,24 the defendant admitted liability for
negligently causing damage to the plaintiff's property,24 9 but as-
serted that discovery had failed to show any malicious intent of
the defendant, thereby precluding punitive damages as a matter
of law 21' The defendant supported his motion with the
plaintiffs' depositions and answers to interrogatories.251 The
court held summary judgment inappropriate where the plaintiffs'
pleading contained allegations of malicious conduct which, if
proved, would support a verdict for punitive damages. 52
A logical difference separates the legal and ethical sufficiency
of the pleading as a formal matter from the body of evidentiary
material admissible at trial to sustain the necessary elements of
245. Id. at 671.
246. A photograph offered into evidence showed that the rack from which the bottle
fell tilted forward slightly. Owens, 205 S.E.2d at 670. The opinon does not state
which party offered this evidence, or whether the plaintiff mentioned the photograph
m her response to the motion.
247. Id. at 671. ("[T]here is nothing m plaintiffs deposition which shows as a mat-
ter of law that the negligence of [defendants), if any, was not a contributing or effi-
cient cause of her injury."); of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986)
(reversing appellate court holding that defendant must negate any inference support-
mg plaintiff's allegation of causation of injury).
248. 210 S.E.2d 165 (Va. 1974).
249. Id. at 166.
250. I& at 167. The court noted that the record contained a suggestion that the
defendant, who had fired a shotgun directed at the plaintiff's house, intended to
frighten the plaintiffs' adult son who resided there. Id. at 166-67. Unlike the status
of the record in Owens, however, this fact would not have supported the- plaintiffs'
recovery, even if proved. It may, in fact, have been submitted in the defendant's
brief to show that no malicious intent was directed at the plaintiffs themselves. Id.
at 167.
251. Id. at 166-67. Contrary to Owens, the deposition ban applied to this appeal. Id.
at 167-68.
252. Id. at 167.
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proof.25 Most pleadings are not sworn but are signed by coun-
sel. Virginia, like most other jurisdictions, is also uncomfortable
with the prospect of counsel testifying on anything but uncon-
tested or peripheral matters.254
To put it bluntly, for the reasons noted above, if reliance on
counsel's averments in the pleadings can defeat summary judg-
ment, a plaintiff who is artful, overly optimistic, or both, can as-
sure the right to a trial disposition when in reality one or more
essential factual elements of the plaintiff's case have no support
whatsoever. Although these considerations have persuaded the
procedural advisory bodies in Virginia, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has not elected to change the rule.
255
In sum, if there is to be summary judgment, and if it is to be
more than a demurrer review under a different name, the obliga-
tion of a plaintiff to respond to a validly-initiated motion must
include more than pointing to paragraphs of the charging plead-
ing. It must require the plaintiff to identify at least some modi-
cum of proof on the specific element asserted as lacking eviden-
tiary support. The responding party should be required to identi-
fy the factual issues that preclude entry of judgment as a matter
of law and to indicate whether any proof will make those fact
issues a viable matter for trial. If no disputed facts on a disposi-
253. As noted above, sanctions are a fairly recent, and still lightly used, develop-
ment in Virginia practice. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. A sum-
mary judgment doctrine, which allows mere averments in pleadings to defeat sum-
mary judgment, is, perhaps, more defensible if active sanction review policed the
integrity of pleading content in Virginia. When the early case *law developed in the
Commonwealth, giving cognizance to the allegations, no such sanction rule existed.
See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., VA. CODE OF PROF RESP DR 5-101 (1981) (expressing restrictions on
accepting employment when counsel might testify); id. DR 5-102 (expressing restric-
tions on continuing representation when counsel may testify).
255. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure in Virginia be-
lieves that it should not be sufficient for a party to rest on averments in the
pleadings, putting aside those instances where they are sworn. Instead, a party
should at least assist the trial judge by identifying the factual material that necessi-
tates a hearing. See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text. The Advisory Com-
mittee approved a plenary proposal to revise the summary judgment rules at its
meeting in April, 1993, and the Judicial Conference of Virginia unanimously adopted
the proposal at its June, 1993, meeting. See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying
text. In September, 1993, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia declined to pro-
mulgate revised summary judgment rules. See infra note 390 and accompanying text.
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tive issue remain, or if a party, after full and fair opportunity for
discovery, has no evidence whatsoever in support of a factual
proposition, summary judgment is appropriate and a rule requir-
ing a full trial would be an irresponsible waste of public resources
as well as an undue burden on the litigants and witnesses.
In two interesting decisions, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
taken an approach somewhat different from the bulk of the re-
ported cases.258 In Macaulay v. Home Beneficial Life Insurance
Co.,25 the court affirmed a summary judgment in an action to
recover on a life insurance policy issued by the defendant.258 Ap-
plicable Virginia law disallowed recovery for loss if the insured's
death indirectly resulted from an accident excluded from cover-
age.259 The court supported its decision with a letter written by
the plaintiffs expert26 ° on the cause of the insured's death,
which stated that the covered accident may have "exacerbated"
his preexisting epileptic condition. 26 ' The court reasoned that
the expert had thus admitted that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover under the policy 262 A dissenting justice argued that
the plaintiff was under no duty to negate any indirect cause of
death at the pretrial stage, having alleged in her pleading that
the covered accident was the direct cause of death.2
The plaintiff in Macaulay would have been justified in expect-
ing to benefit from the Owens rule during the pretrial proceed-
ings. The statement in the letter certainly tended to support the
defendant's position;2 4 however, the plaintiff asserted that the
256. Carson v. LeBlanc, 427 S.E.2d 189 (Va. 1993); Macaulay v. Home Beneficial
Life Ins. Co. 369 S.E.2d 420 (Va. 1988).
257. 369 S.E.2d 420 (Va. 1988).
258. Id. at 420, 422.
259. Id. at 421.
260. In response to requests for admission, the plaintiff indicated that the insured's
family physician was the only expert who would testify as to the cause of death. Id.
261. Id, at 421-22.
262. Id. at 422. The Supreme Court appeared to rely on two controlling cases in-
volving the same issue of insurance coverage. Id. (citing Tanner v. Life Ins. Co., 227
S.E.2d 693 (Va. 1976); Crowder v. General Accident, Fire, & Life Assurance Corp., 21
S.E.2d 772 (Va. 1942)). In those cases, judgments were granted to insurers after the
plamtiffs' presentation of expert testimony at trial. Tanner, 227 S.E.2d at 694-95;
Crowder, 21 S.E.2d at 774.
263. Macaulay, 369 S.E.2d at 422 (Compton, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 421-22.
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expert would refute this implication at trial.265 As the dissent
noted, while subject to impeachment at trial, the credibility of
such testimony, is ordinarily an inappropriate issue for summary
judgment.266 In effect, the Supreme Court of Virginia approved
the trial court's prediction of the effect of the expert's testimony
from the pretrial record. Based on that assessment, the court
applied the same standard that would be applied at the trial
stage, arguably without giving the plaintiff fair notice of the
increased burden of production.6 7
Subsequent cases have not uniformly followed Macaulay's
approach.6 In another case, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reached a similar result. In Carson v. LeBlanc,"9 the
defendant used the deposition testimony of accident witnesses to
formulate requests for admissions.20 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant on the basis of those ad-
missions 271 and the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the result
on appeal.12 Carson and Macaulay stand for an exception to
the general "no duty" rule created when a respondent has identi-
fied its exclusive evidence and the court can assess that evidence
from the pretrial record.
Enforcing an obligation to go beyond the face of the pleading
could create a strategic device by which a defendant could file an
early summary judgment application in order to "rush" the
plaintiff.273 As noted earlier,274 most jurisdictions, but not Vir-
265. Id. at 422 (Compton, J., dissenting) (noting plaintiff's response to a request for
admissions, stating that at trial the physician would support plaintiff's claim regard-
ing the cause of death).
266. Id. at 422-23.
267. Although the court did not cite or discuss the Owens rule, the Macaulay case
can be distinguished. First, one might argue that the plaintiff did, in fact, "fully
develop" the essential allegation because expert testimony is determinative of the
cause of death. Alternatively, one could argue that the plaintiff did not substantially
or measurably develop his allegations and thus did not receive the Owens "no duty"
protection. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text. The dissent in Macaulay
effectively rebuts these possibilities. Macaulay, 369 S.E.2d at 422.
268. See, e.g., Renner v. Stafford, 429 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1993).
269. 427 S.E.2d 189 (1993).
270. Id. at 190.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 193.
273. See Risinger, supra note 105, at 41.
274. See text accompanying notes 159-60.
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ginia, have dealt with this risk (which is little different from a
defendant insisting on an immediate trial on the merits) by pro-
viding for the option to defer response to a summary judgment
application in cases where discovery is needed. 5 In some cases,
of course, namely where the fact needed to defeat summary judg-
ment is exclusively in the plaintiffs own possession, such a delay
is unwarranted."' Conversely, when a plaintiff can set forth by
affidavit the matters that require discovery in order to address a
summary judgment application, the rules of procedure should
permit the trial judge to grant that application. Indeed, in appro-
priate cases the rules should encourage the trial court to tailor
proceedings so that the discovery specifically directed to issues on
the pending motion have temporal priority, allowing the motion
to be brought to disposition more quickly 277 A modified version
of this common form of timing provision should be incorporated
into the Virginia rule.27
2. Affidavts
Every American jurisdiction, state and federal, permits the use
of affidavits on summary judgment motions, except Virginia. 9
In many jurisdictions, case law requires that the affiants have
275. See FED. R. CIV. P 56(f); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986);
see also Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1518 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stat-
mg that such applications are granted almost routinely upon affidavit), aff'd, 946
F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1171 (1992).
276. See, e.g., Gieringer v. Silverman, 539 F. Supp. 498, 503-04 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(asserting that plaintiffs had failed to show that information "not m their possession"
would control the summary disposition), aft'd, 731 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1984).
277. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537,
541 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the lower court had reserved decision on the
defendant's motion for summary judgment pending limited discovery under Rule
56(f)); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., No. 93-C-1601, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1210, at
*24 & n.13, *39 (N.D. Il. Feb. 4, 1994) (granting Rule 56(f) motion m part);
Portsmouth Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartments Assocs., 847 F. Supp. 380, 382
n.2 (E.D. Va. 1994) (stating that the parties were conducting "limited discovery" on
summary judgment motion issues); Failor v. Westex, Inc., 605 A.2d 390, 392 (Pa.
Super. Ct 1992) (noting deferral of decision on summary judgment motion pending
additional limited discovery).
278. The modification arises by distinguishing between cases where the fact focused
on is within plaintiff's own control, making discovery unnecessary, and those where it
is not. See znfra part IV
279. See znfra app. B.
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personal knowledge of the facts represented in the declara-
tion."' Many cases also comment on the limited role for attor-
ney affidavits in summary judgment applications."'
The existence of the oath and the concomitant availability of
penalties for perjury make affidavits inherently more reliable
than unsworn litigation papers. In addition, they compare favor-
ably to unsworn transactional documents commonly utilized as
evidentiary matter in most jurisdictions.2
Affidavits have the additional advantage of precision. The trial
judge's task lies in assessing whether there is in fact a "hole" in
the proof available to the party with the burden of persuasion.
This determination may be difficult when the assessment must
be made solely on the basis of preexisting transactional docu-
ments or physical proof. It is not clear on the face of many such
exhibits what their exact scope and application is, when and how
they are prepared, and what the parties' intentions were when
they were created. Where proof is submitted by affidavit, howev-
er, nothing impedes a judge from addressing the issues on which
the motion focuses. If a witness with knowledge can supply the
fact which the movant claims is nonexistent, the affidavit will
end the summary judgment motion quickly, easily, and inexpen-
280. See, e.g., Pettigrew v. Harris, 631 So. 2d 839, 841 (Ala. 1993) (discussing state
Rule 56(e) which requires the affidavit to show affirmatively that the affiant is com-
petent to give the evidence presented); Brozo v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 865
S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that TEX. R. CIV. P 166a(f) requires a
showing of admissibility and witness competency).
Conclusory affidavits that do not show personal knowledge are inadequate. Casey
v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting m part); Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1341-42
(4th Cir. 1992); Davis v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1988) (as-
serting that a lack of personal knowledge violates not only Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure but also Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(e) "requires that affidavits supporting or
opposing summary judgment shall be made on the basis of personal knowledge."
Wright v. Yurko, 446 So. 2d 1162, 1166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); accord Express
Publisinng Co. v. Giam Inv. Co., 449 So. 2d 145, 146-47 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
281. See, e.g., Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 969-70 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the affidavit of counsel failed to satisfy Rule 56(e) because it did not
cite to the record or to the attached documents and thus lacked any showing of
personal knowledge).
282. An example of the latter might be letters said to provide notice of an event
and attached to a pleading.
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sively Conversely, if the evidence is truly nonexistent and the
party with the burden of proof and full access to the relevant
information cannot supply an affidavit addressing the point high-
lighted by the movant, a trial judge can easily recognize that if
proof on the point existed, the affidavit would supply it, and the
defect in the proof of the party with the burden becomes apparent.
The federal rules and the rules of most states list affidavits as
a prominent category of cognizable evidentiary material utilizable
on summary judgment.2" This accords with the requirement
generally enforced in these jurisdictions that the material set
forth on summary judgment issues be susceptible to being re-
duced to an admissible form." 4 The affidavit, with personal
knowledge of the facts recited therein, constitutes a dress re-
hearsal for the oral testimony of that individual on direct exami-
nation. Indeed, some jurisdictions have express requirements that
the affidavit set forth in its preliminary paragraphs the basis for
the affiant's personal knowledge of the facts recited, a foundation
requirement not unlike that typically applied in American court-
rooms at the trial stage." 5
The Virginia summary judgment rules do not mention affida-
283. See FED. R CIV. P 56(c) (requiring judgment to be rendered "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue"); see also znfra app. B (detail-
ing the use of affidavits for summary judgment decisions in the states).
284. See, e.g., Harrelson v. Community Fed. Say. & Loan, 540 So. 2d 55, 57 (Ala.
1989) (asserting that madmissible matter was not sufficient under state Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e)); Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait, 793 P.2d 69, 74-76 (Alaska 1990)
(reading state Civil Rule 56(e) to require authentication of materials otherwise ad-
mssible under state evidence rules); see also Cromer v. Sefton, 471 N.E.2d 700, 705-
06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that evidentiary material supporting a summary judg-
ment must be admissible); Hopkins v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d
209, 213 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that evidence offered in a summary judgment
motion must be admissible at trial).
285. See Schulte Corp. v. New Eng. Door and Hardware, Inc., No. CV 93-04551235,
1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2197, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1993) ("affida-
vits must aver or affirmatively show personal knowledge of the matters stated
therein"); Morgan v. City of Independence, No. 64057, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5883,
at *12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1993) (finding an affidavit lacking personal knowl-
edge and containing averments mixed with legal conclusions inadequate); cf. FED. R.
EVID. 601, 602 (requiring witness competency and testimony based on personal
knowledge).
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vits.286 The substance of the rule is so skimpy, however, that
one might argue that the absence of an affidavit provision is not
the equivalent of a rule foreclosing their use. The rule does not
even expressly authorize the use of any evidentiary matters.8 7
Instead, the only items expressly delineated in the rule are
pleadings, orders, and admissions.88 Indeed, the Part Four dis-
covery rule, providing for requests for admissions,2 89 is not
cross-referenced in the summary judgment rule, where the con-
cept of admissions is raised.290 That omission leaves it unclear
whether other forms of party admissions and stipulations are
appropriate or permissible for consideration on the motion.
The prevailing wisdom in Virginia is that affidavits are not
admissible on summary judgment.2 9' Numerous trial court deci-
sions recite this limitation,292 and Virginia Supreme Court au-
thority supports the proposition. 293 The proposition also has
crept into the secondary authority 294 On the other hand, we
have studied all reported Virginia appellate decisions involving
summary judgment and have detected instances where a party's
affidavit was not only considered among the appropriate materi-
als in a summary judgment analysis, but was crucial.2 9
286. See supra note 227.
287. VA. SUP CT. R. 2:21, 3:18.
288. Id.
289. Id. rule 4:11 (modelled on FED. R. CIV. P 36).
290. Id. rules 2:21, 3:18.
291. See sources cited znfra notes 292-94.
292. See, e.g., Skeen v. Indian Acres Club, Inc., 27 Va. Cir. 167, 168 (1992); Paul
Watson Enters. v. Miller & Smith Land, Inc., 27 Va. Cir. 139, 139 (1992); Daclouche
v. H.B.L., Inc., 25 Va. Cir. 243, 246 (1991); Janney v. Rappahanock Area Community
Servs. Bd., 14 Va. Cir. 249, 250-51 (1988); Hennage Creative Printers, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Taxation, 9 Va. Cir. 104, 104 (1987).
293. See Town of Ashland v. Ashland Inv. Co., 366 S.E.2d 100 (Va. 1988). Although
the court in Ashland stated that the movant's "self-serving assertions" in an ex parte
affidavit were not "evidence" to support the motion, it did not suggest that it was
outside the power of the trial judge to consider affidavits per se. Id. at 103. Rather,
the divergent legal theories argued by the parties on summary judgment rendered the
movant's affidavit assertions insufficient to support the granting of summary judg-
ment. Id.
294. The Virgina trial judge's handbook states that the rule does not permit the
use of affidavits. See JOHN F DAFFRON, VIRGINIA CIRCUIT JUDGES BENCHBOOK, CIVIL
94 (Supp. 1994).
295. See, e.g., Stone v. Alley, 392 S.E.2d 486 (Va. 1990); Bloodworth v. Ellis, 267
S.E.2d 96 (Va. 1980).
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Several cases have treated affidavits filed by a party as among
the proper materials for consideration on a summary judgment
motion.298 In one such instance, a court found affidavits of the
parties sufficient to raise factual issues, even against constitu-
tional presumptions such as the "full faith and credit" normally
accorded to a sister state judgment.297 In fact, the same decision
which reached that conclusion took cogmzance of an affidavit of
counsel, where the subject matter was within the personal knowl-
edge of the attorney in the professional role.29 Affidavits of
third parties not before the court also have been used and ap-
proved.299
There is no principled argument against the use of affidavits
on summary judgment. The most telling point is that the alter-
native is to allow a party to rely on an unsworn pleading, perhaps
even a pleading in very general terms."0 0 Clearly, an affidavit
from a person with personal knowledge of the facts is superior to
the unsworn, often cryptic draftsmanship of counsel in a pleading
if the goal is to determine whether sufficient facts will be avail-
able to make a triable issue for full hearing at trial.
Admittedly, affidavits also are routinely drafted by lawyers.
But unless we indulge the assumption that perjury is rampant in
the legal system, both in litigation matters and non-litigated
transactions, the dignity and rigor of the oath provide important
assurances of reliability, close to those afforded at the trial it-
self.30' Impeachment at trial adds another safeguard to deter
false affidavits because changes in the witness' position will be
damaging. 302
At public bar meetings that have discussed summary judgment
296. See Stone, 392 S.E.2d at 486.
297. Bloodworth, 267 S.E.2d at 98.
298. Id. at 96 (describing the affidavit as addressing whether a client was present
in court during court proceedings).
299. Virguna Capital Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 343 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Va.
1986) (considering the affidavit of the maker of a note involved in suit between a
bank and its insurer).
300. Tins is the rule in Virginia. See supra notes 232-54 and accompanying text.
301. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (Michie 1950) (classifying perjury as a Class 5
felony).
302. See 1 CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA §§ 4-1, at 403,
407 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1994).
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reform in Virginia, plaintiffs' bar representatives have voiced the
loudest opposition. Thus, it should be noted that a rule change
authorizing the use of affidavits is essentially a pro-plaintiff alter-
ation of the rules. In the paradigm case, where the defendant has
asserted that there is no proof on a particular issue or set of is-
sues, one would perhaps be comforted by having this representa-
tion be made in the form of an affidavit. In those circumstances,
an attorney's affidavit might even be appropriate. Such an affida-
vit might assert, for example, that a review of the deposition
transcripts and documents produced has been conducted in prep-
aration for the litigation, and that no support for a particular
proposition has been discerned. The most important use of an
affidavit would be on behalf of the party with the burden of
proof, who must set forth some reason for the court to recognize
a triable issue on the topic identified by the movant. Authorizing
the use of affidavits permits the plaintiff in those circumstances
to seek out any witness with personal knowledge of the requisite
facts and to craft an express statement addressing the issue at-
tacked in the motion. Thus a common, and perhaps the most im-
portant, function of permitting affidavits would be to allow, at
the time of summary judgment, a surrogate for items which will
be proven at trial through oral testimony as opposed to exhibits.
Affidavits also may be helpful with respect to exhibits. An
affidavit that lays the foundation for the admissibility of exhibits,
and that may deal with any apparent objections that appear
applicable on the face of the document, would be an important
addition to the mix of information provided to the trial judge on
summary judgment.
Thus, the criticism that affidavits are lawyers' documents,
created expressly for the purposes of the motion on which they
are submitted, completely misses the point. In comparison to
review of the case on the face of the pleadings, affidavits present
substantial advantages. True, the affiant's demeanor is not sub-
ject to review by the trier of fact. The function of the summary
judgment screen on pending cases is not, however, to weigh the
evidence submitted by the parties. Rather, its function is to de-
termine whether a factual controversy exists on the issue or
issues identified by the movant. On occasion, an affidavit will
overstate an evidentiary point in a fashion that can be corrected
1694 [Vol. 36:1633
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only at trial through cross-examination, impeachment, and re-
view of other proofs. The fact remains, however, that in assessing
whether a trial is necessary, the record is significantly more reli-
able if the parties are encouraged by the rules routinely to attest
to the existence of disputed facts through the submission of
sworn statements at the summary judgment stage than if the
court were to rely on unsworn papers.
A search of federal and state databases for cases discussing
abuse of the affidavit mechanism in summary judgment applica-
tions reveals no evidence whatsoever that the provisions of other
jurisdictions, which routinely allow affidavits, have led to prac-
tices which favor one side or the other in the litigation arena, or
which mislead the court in reviewing summary judgment mo-
tions. The Supreme Court of Virginia also has demonstrated that
it will not be misled by self-serving affidavits. 3 In light of the
development of early summary judgment statutes, which ap-
proved the use of plaintiff affidavits to prove liquidated
claims,"' it indeed would seem illogical that the current rule
would prohibit the moving party-or the responder-from
"speaking for himself' as to the issues raised by the motion.
3. Depositzons
One of the most perplexing features of Virginia summary judg-
ment practice is the fact that the use of deposition transcripts in
the review of summary judgment applications is foreclosed by
statute and a correlative rule unless the parties stipulate in ad-
vance that such transcripts will be cognizable on the motion.
In Leslie v. Nitz °5 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
summary judgment could be entered based on facts adduced by
discovery depositions "when it plainly appears from such deposi-
tions that there remains no material fact genuinely in dis-
pute."' Unfortunately, the General Assembly barred this prac-
tice eighteen months later by adopting the predecessor of Code
303. See znfra text accompanying notes 357-62 (describing Town of Ashland v.
Ashland Inv. Co., 366 S.E.2d 100 (Va. 1988)).
304. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
305. 184 S.E.2d 755 (Va. 1971).
306. Id. at 756-57.
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section 8.01-420. 307 This statute precludes the use of depositions
in support of a summary judgment motion unless both sides have
consented to that procedure."' 8 Strangely, by its terms the stat-
ute is very one sided: it precludes the use of deposition tran-
scripts to support a summary judgment application but does not
bar their use to oppose the motion.
Other than Virginia, every American jurisdiction, state and
federal, permits the use of deposition transcripts on summary
judgment applications.309 Yet no legislative study report accom-
panied the enactment of what is now codified as section 8.01-420
of the Code of Virginia to explain its rationale. Since the section's
enactment, the Rules of Court have been amended to implement
the restriction imposed by the statute by restating it in the sum-
mary judgment provisions.310
Although it may be apocryphal, the same story about the ori-
gins of section 8.01-420 circulates at every professional gathering
that discusses summary judgment.31 According to this explana-
tion, a lawyer representing a personal injury plaintiff lost a case
when his client made an admission at deposition-an admission
that was later quoted in summary judgment papers. The lawyer,
a member of the General Assembly, sponsored a bill in the next
session of the legislature to preclude this from happening again.
Some would say, of course, that if sworn testimony of the
plaintiff indicates that he has no claim, the case should be dis-
missed on summary judgment. Treating the concern of the
plaintiffs bar evidenced in the statute more charitably, one
might note that Virginia has a fairly well-known doctrine that
307. VA. CODE ANN. § 8:01-420 (Michie 1992).
308. Id. Section 8.01-420 provides:
Depositions as basis for motion for summary judgment or to strike evi-
dence.-No motion for summary judgment or to strike the evidence shall
be sustained when based in whole or in part upon any discovery deposi-
tions under Rule 4:5, unless all parties to the suit or action shall agree
that such deposition may be so used.
Id.
309. See infra app. B.
310. This limitation is repeated in both VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18 and 2:21. See supra
note 227 (text of Rule 3:18).
311. For example, this story was recounted at the annual Boyd-Graves conference on
Virgina civil procedure in 1992 and 1993, and at a meeting of the Council of the
Litigation Section of the Virgmia Bar Association in September, 1993.
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may have once made this fear plausible. The doctrine is known as
the rule of Massie v. Firmstone,312 and it stands for the promi-
nently enunciated proposition that in litigation, a party's con-
clusive admission limiting his case will have effect. A party's case,
it was said, can rise no higher than her statements."' 3
The Massie doctrine may reflect concerns that prevailed prior
to the prevalence of pre-trial preparation through discovery and
other procedures. In an earlier era, before sanctions and the
fuller exposition of facts that, characterize modern litigation, the
weapons of cross-examination and impeachment were much
weaker because the underlying facts had been explored far less
completely As a result, the risk that a party would perjure her-
self at trial, in order to contradict statements made in unguarded
moments before the proceeding reached the adjudicatory stage,
was greater than it is today
The binding admissions doctrine of Massie v. Firmstone per-
sists as a part of Virginia law, despite the fact that discovery
devices are now available on both sides of court. 14 Those who
fear that this doctrine will cause untoward results on summary
judgment applications have failed to read the decisions imple-
menting the doctrine over the last fifteen years. At the time of
the enactment of Code section 8.01-420, it may have appeared
that a single slip of the tongue could doom a party's case regard-
less of the circumstances of the litigation. Whether or not that
was a legitimate fear in 1973, when the Code section was enact-
ed, it has become crystal clear in recent years that the Massie
doctrine will not have that effect.
First, the doctrine applies only to unqualified admissions. The
Massie approach is limited to flat statements of fact in contexts
where the declarant must have had direct personal knowl-
312. 114 S.E. 652 (Va. 1922).
313. Id. at 656; see also Charlton v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 369 S.E.2d 175,
177 (Va. 1988) (citing trial court in Massze v. Firmstone).
Some cases have implied that evidence other than the litigant's own statements
may limit the claim in tis fashion. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Gulley, 194 S.E. 683,
686 (Va. 1938) (finding that "Mrs. Gulley is bound by the admissions of herself and
the chauffeur").
314. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:0 (stating that discovery rules "apply in civil cases in
both actions at law and suits in equity").
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edge. 15 Several cases have shown that any interpretation that
could characterize a party's statement as shaded with opinion
will mean that the purported admission is not binding.316 Sec-
ond, the Massie doctrine is limited to party statements,3 17 and
thus has no effect on the propriety of using non-party depositions
on summary judgment. Third, and more importantly, it applies
only to admissions of fact, not opinion.18 Fourth, and equally
important, is the strong emphasis in recent case law on treating
the testimony of a party as a whole. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has made it clear that the totality of a party's proof, rather
than isolated statements from a deposition or other statement
taken alone or out of context, determines whether a point is
conceded. 19 If one response seems to make an admission, but
other answers support a contrary view, the Massze doctrine does
not cause the concession to be adopted.32° Thus, the Massze v.
Firmstone doctrine cannot selectively isolate a party's statements
if there is evidence elsewhere in the transcript that supports a
contrary inference. Under this rule, as presently applied by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, improvident pieces of testimony can-
not foreclose a party's proof on summary judgment or at trial.
Given these striking cases, which all but eliminate the impact
of Massze, the Supreme Court of Virginia is signaling clearly that
a party's improvident statements will not be used to strike a case
315. See Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. Woodyard, 419 S.E.2d 627 (Va. 1992).
316. See, e.g., zd., Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d 675 (Va. 1982).
317. The doctrine is said to relate to statements of a "litigant." Austin v. Jewell,
349 S.E.2d 113, 115 (Va. 1986); Bartholomew, 297 S.E.2d at 680.
318. See Ravenwood Towers, 419 S.E.2d at 629-30 (construing the elderly victim's
statement of what she probably could have seen if she had looked down before step-
ping into an elevator as inherently speculative for purposes of the Massie rule).
319. TransiLift Equip., Ltd. v. Cunmngham, 360 S.E.2d 183, 189 (Va. 1987); see
Austin, 349 S.E.2d at 115.
[Tihe rule in Massze [does not] apply to an adverse statement standing in
isolation from the litigant's testimony as a whole Rather, "[a] dam-
aging statement made in one part of his testimony must be considered in
the light of an explanation of such statement made in a later part of his
testimony. And it is generally for the jury to determine whether it
will accept such explanation or clarification."
Id. (citing Barnes v. Parker, 225 S.E.2d 403, 407 (Va. 1976); Virginia Elec. & Power
Co. v. Mabm, 125 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1962)); see also Olsten v. Leftwich, 336
S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1985); Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Moseley, 335 S.E.2d 272 (Va. 1985).
320. TransiLift, 360 S.E.2d at 189.
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precipitously Indeed, the only case upholding the use of the
Massze doctrine in recent decades involved the statement of a
party plaintiff who had personally observed the defendant's vehi-
cle during a car accident."' The testimony related to where the
vehicles impacted on the roadway and called for no other gloss on
the direct evidentiary report. 22
Massie is essentially a trial doctrine, and if deposition tran-
scripts will be used at trial, which they will,32 there is every
reason to consider them during pretrial motions as well. When
the binding admissions doctrine applies, a party who has made an
admission in a deposition will lose at trial. If that is so, in those
rare Virginia cases in which the doctrine of binding admissions
still applies, there is no rationale for failing to allow those state-
ments to be utilized on summary judgment motions.
Depositions are at least as reliable as affidavits, and may repre-
sent a more trustworthy form of proof in summary judgment
adjudications. A review of decisions in other state and federal
courts, which use deposition transcripts on summary judgment,
discloses no suggestion of abuse. In fact, a deposition provides
greater protection than does an affidavit. In the normal case, a
deponent appears in person for the taking of testimony, is placed
under oath, and gives the testimony in the presence of the ste-
nographer and counsel. 24 The testimony is not only more spon-
taneous than that given in affidavit form, but it is also subject to
follow-up questions, giving the party an opportunity to probe and
inquire repeatedly in order to elicit relevant information. 25 Fi-
nally, the opportunity is accorded to the witness' counsel to con-
duct "cross" examination of the witness.
Although it is used sparingly in practice, this option provides a
contemporaneous opportunity for the opposing party to cure
possible misstatements and to elicit testimony placing other
statements in context. The availability of supplemental question-
ing on depositions means that no party should fear that an mad-
321. Deskms v. T.H. Nichols Lme Contractor, Inc., 361 S.E.2d 125 (Va. 1987).
322. Id. at 126.
323. See, e.g., Home v. Milgrnm, 306 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1983).
324. See VA. SUP CT. R. 4:5.
325. Id. rule 4:5(c).
326. Id.
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vertent slip by an unsophisticated deponent will doom her case
because the Massze v. Firmstone doctrine is clearly inapplicable
when the totality of the transcript includes contrary positions. In
contrast to the rigidity of affidavit submissions, during a deposi-
tion, counsel can interpose objections and ask follow-up ques-
tions, giving alternative versions of facts covered by the initial
questions.
Depositions are not used as preclusive admissions under dis-
covery rules and under court decisions applying those rules.
These transcripts are merely permissible evidence. The Supreme
Court of Virginia made it very clear, in TransiLift Equipment and
other cases, that depositions are not the equivalent of a formal
legal admission." ' Instead, the transcript is admissible as "some
evidence" on the points it addresses.32 Contrary proof is recog-
nized and permitted.329
Another way to view the problem, however, is to recognize that
depositions are used at trial.33° A second irony arises from the
present statute's ban on the use of depositions to support a sum-
mary judgment motion. Under the Rules of Court and prevailing
case law, deposition transcripts may be used at trial for a variety
of purposes, including impeachment."3 ' They also may be used
as proof on the merits in three significant circumstances: (1) in
equity, (2) where the witness is more than 100 miles from the
trial, and (3) where the deponent is a party 332 In the case of
party depositions, the transcript may be used for any pur-
pose.33 It is stunningly illogical that a deposition transcript has
such extensive use at the trial stage, yet is wholly unusable when
considering a potentially dispositive summary judgment motion
that might obviate the trial or a portion of the issues.
Before the enactment of section 8.01-420, the Supreme Court
327. TransiLift Equip., Ltd. v. Cunningham, 360 S.E.2d 183, 188 (Va. 1987); see
Home, 306 S.E.2d at 895.
328. TransLift, 360 S.E.2d at 188.
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Alexandria, 431 S.E.2d 275, 276 (Va. 1993); Chattin
v. Chattin, 427 S.E.2d 347, 349 (Va. 1993); Braden v. Isabell K Horsley Real Estate,
Ltd., 425 S.E.2d 481, 483-84 (Va. 1993).
331. VA. SUP CT. R. 4:7(a)(2).
332. Id.
333. Id., see also Horne v. Milgrim, 306 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1983).
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of Virginia evaluated the use of depositions on summary judg-
ment and found such transcripts appropriate for this purpose."3 4
When depositions could be used at the summary judgment phase,
they helped resolve, a wide variety of issues, including whether a
plaintiff was contributorily negligent.3"' Even when the use of
deposition testimony for summary judgment was cognizable in
Virginia, however, the doctrine required adequate development of
an issue before the testimony could resolve a factual issue.3 '
Bar support for a complete abolition of Code section 8.01-420 is
widespread."3 ' Only the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, or at
least its leadership, has opposed the abolition of the provision.3 8
4. Other Exhibits: Use at Trial and on Motion
As noted in passing above, the Virginia summary judgment
rule inexplicably fails to acknowledge the propriety of using con-
tractual documents, notices, and other contemporaneous exhibits
arising from the litigated transaction as part of the summary
judgment motion procedure. The rule also fails to permit express-
ly the use of interrogatory answers. In our view, interrogatory
responses, which, in Virginia, are signed by the responding par-
ty,33 9 are as reliable as affidavits, and should be included in the
provisions of the rule for similar reasons.
334. Leslie v. Nitz, 184 S.E.2d 755 (Va. 1971).
335. See, e.g., Reed v. Carlyle & Martin, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1974).
336. See, e.g., Marion v. Terry, 184 S.E.2d 761 (Va. 1971); Paytan v. Rowland, 155
S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1967).
337. The Council of the Litigation Section of the Virginia Bar Association (VBA)
met m 1992 and discussed the proposal to abolish § 8.01-420, voting fifteen-to-one m
favor of abolition. The Executive Committee of the VBA later endorsed the proposal
as well.
Legislation to abolish Code § 8.01-420 was introduced at the VBA's behest in the
1993 session of the General Assembly, but was not enacted.
338. Members of the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association (VTLA), solicited by the
Virginia State Bar's (VSB) Litigation Section, voted overwhelmingly in favor of aboli-
tion of this code provision. The VSB Litigation Section voted 248-to-12 m favor of
abolishing § 8.01-420 (95%), and even among VTLA members the vote was 57-to-8
(88%). See Judicial Council of Virginia, Agenda Materials, June 28, 1993, at 53-55
(Letter from James P Wheeler, Mar. 17, 1993).
The VSB Litigation Section's Board of Governors voted Mar. 26, 1993, to sup-
port repeal of § 8.01-420 by an almost unanimous vote.
339. VA. SUP. CT. K. 4:8(d).
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One of the most poignarit ironies of the present state of
Virginia's summary judgment rules flows from the rule's failure
to achieve the advance assessment function of which it is capable.
The summary judgment process, when properly implemented, can
provide pretrial review of a key issue, obviating cases in which
the factual insufficiency of a claim is not discovered until mid-
trial, and eliminating the attendant waste, delay, and costs in-
herent in such a late revelation.
At trial, discovery fruits are admissible along with properly
authenticated documents and other exhibits. TransiLift Equzp-
ment, Ltd. v. Cunnzngham34 ° is the leading case on the use and
effect of discovery fruits at trial, clearly articulating the mechan-
ics and logic of their use.34' Admissions elicited under Rule 4.11
are conclusive if they are properly offered by the party benefitted
thereby, and if that party makes timely objection to his
adversaries' efforts to offer additional proof which may contradict
or vary the thrust of the admissions.342 However, the court also
established that interrogatory answers and deposition statements
can be used at trial when the presenting party lays a proper
foundation.343 Such statements are not conclusive, but they are
admissible as pertinent evidence on the propositions they
address. 4 It is therefore odd that the summary judgment rule
dbes not appear to contemplate the use of these statements.
5. The Admzssibility Focus
The Virginia rule also fails to spell out the goal, which every
other state articulates, that materials used on summary judg-
ment should be admissible at trial or should appear in a form
that plausibly can be reduced to admissible evidence at trial. 4'
This requirement is key to making the accelerated determination
that is the hallmark of summary judgment-whether the party
with the burden of proof will have any admissible evidence on the
340. 360 S.E.2d 183 (Va. 1987).
341. Id. at 183.
342. Id. at 188.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See app. B.
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issues identified by the movant as lacking support.
6. Procedural Roadmap
Formalistic features and substance of summary judgment pro-
cedure merge. The present Virginia rule, unlike that in most
other states, contains almost no procedural provisions. It pre-
scribes the timing of such applications only to the extent of re-
quiring that the parties be at issue prior to filing the motion. As
a result, there is a vacuum of authority and guidance on the
question of how to appropriately commence a summary judgment
motion and what the obligations of responding parties are.
The existing rule's failure to provide procedural guidance debil-
itates summary judgment review in at least three ways. First, the
Supreme Court of Virginia's decisions seemingly indicate that
trial judges often fail to grapple appropriately with the issues on
summary judgment. Second, the rule's failure to provide for the
common situation in which cross-motions for summary judgment
are filed has led to at least one case in which the parties have
abused the summary judgment system.346 Third, the absence of
procedural directions foments mistakes and fears about both the
extent of the moving party's burden to identify issues on summa-
ry judgment and the opposing party's parallel obligation to equip
the trial court with the information needed to evaluate the mo-
tion fairly
The Supreme Court of Virginia has commented, more than
once in recent years, about a trial court's improvident entry of
summary disposition.34 Our analysis of these instances, and
related reversals in which the court held that summary judgment
was improvidently entered (with or without comment by the
reviewing court), suggests that the present rule contributes to
reversals to some extent by failing to provide for the identifica-
tion of specifically enumerated fact issues on which summary
judgment will .turn.
The present Virginia rule, in contrast to most modern proce-
346. See infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (discussing Town of Ashland v.
Ashland Inv. Co., 366 S.E.2d 100 (Va. 1988)).
347. See, e.g., CaterCorp Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 431 S.E.2d 277, 279 (Va.
1993).
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dural systems' summary judgment provisions, merely restates a
general test to the effect that "[s]ummary judgment shall not be
entered if any material fact is genuinely in dispute." '348 No pro-
vision is made, however, to assist the trial judge in focusing on
the material facts, disputed or otherwise.349
Numerous federal district courts, grappling with the need for
summary adjudication to dispose of a huge volume of civil filings,
have developed local rules of court that assist trial judges by
requiring the parties to specify the key material facts."' 0 Some
states, such as California, have incorporated such a provision into
their summary judgment statute or their rule. 51
Typically, jurisdictions adopting this approach require a state-
ment of material undisputed facts. Because the movant is the
first to propose that the adversary's case lacks proof on a neces-
sary element, courts with these rules require the movant to sup-
port the notice of motion with a statement of undisputed
facts.352 The responding party must then include a counter state-
ment of material facts in dispute as part of the responsive papers,
alleging that the disputed issues are sufficient to preclude sum-
mary judgment.353
348. VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18.
349. See text accompanying notes 180-81.
350. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 3(g).
351. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(c) (West 1973).
352. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. City of Santa Maria, 16 Cal. App. 4th 685,
690 (1993); Downs v. A&H Constr., Ltd., 481 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1992) (sup-
porting motion with affidavit and statement of undisputed fact pursuant to IOVA R.
CIV. P 237(h)); Diamond Prods. Co. v. Skipton Painting & Insulating, Inc., 392
N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1986) (finding error in granting of summary judgment due to
absence of statement of undisputed facts that would have focused parties and trial
court on the issues); cf Coy v. County of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1077, 1084
(1991) (finding statement of undisputed facts supplemented by other evidence in reply
to the adversary's opposition to motion).
353. See Bush v. Parents Without Partners, 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 325 n.1 (1993)
(stating that response is not a separate statement of undisputed facts under Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c) but is a statement indicating agreement or dis-
agreement with the movant's statement).
If no response is filed, the court likely will find that the movant has demon-
strated the existence of undisputed facts. See, e.g., Williams v. Davenport Commum-
cations Ltd. Partnership, 438 N.W.2d 855, 856 (Iowa 1989); Guiggey v. Bombardier,




These rules have a generally salutary effect but fail to precisely
serve their purpose; the goal is to identify factual issues that will
be resolved against the party with the burden of proof at trial.
These issues may be evidenced in two different ways. They may
be propositions for which the movant has evidentiary material
and the plaintiff has none, or they may be propositions on which
only the plaintiff would have evidentiary material, and the mov-
ant commences the motion by pointing out the absence of appar-
ent support for the proposition that the plaintiff must prove.
Thus the "material fact statement" requirement should focus the
movant, and later the adversary, on those factual issues that are
asserted to be dispositive. This limitation is essential in avoiding
the specter, decried by some critics, of huge burdens that would
require the responding parties to present their entire case in
response to a terse motion. Part IV of this Article sets forth such
a rule, appropriately focused.
7 Cross-Motzons.
Frequently, both parties file motions for summary judgment.
These cases commonly involve construction of a written instru-
ment, applicability of a statute or other legislative action, or
stipulated facts. The law is clear, however, that the mere filing of
opposing motions does not warrant the trial court in assuming
that summary judgment is appropriate.354 As the Supreme
Court of Virginia has said, "merely because both litigants be-
lieved [that] the evidence was sufficiently complete to decide the
case does not relieve the trial judge of the responsibility and duty
to make an independent evaluation of the record on that is-
sue. ' 355 Instead, the judge must evaluate each of the competing
applications to determine whether either side is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law 3" A prominent case in the modern era,
354. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. County Bd., 409 S.E.2d 130 (Va. 1991).
355. Central Nat'l Ins. Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Virgima Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
282 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Va. 1981).
356. On the other hand, if the parties stipulate to undisputed facts that each argues
will warrant judgment, the court may find that there are no questions precluding the
entry of judgment. Some cases on stipulated facts, however, have been deemed map-
propriate for summary adjudication because the legal issues, properly understood,
were not completely addressed by the facts to which the parties agreed in the stipu-
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Town of Ashland v. Ashland Investment Co.," ' demonstrates
that the parties may abuse these rules through the filing of cross-
motions that deprive the trial court of responsive material on
either of them.
When there are cross-motions on different legal theories, the
possibility of failing to address the adversary's legal claim or
defense always exists. The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed
such a case in Ashland, finding that the parties' arguments
"rush[ed] past each other without meeting, like trains on paral-
lel tracks." ' The court vindicated the party who had lost on
a summary judgment, by remanding the case for further pro-
ceedings. 59
A party should have the obligation to respond to a summary
judgment motion, but the articulation of that requirement in
Virginia remains to be achieved. Indeed, the outcome of the
Ashland decision arguably undermines that requirement. In
Ashland, the municipality failed to respond to the legal and fac-
tual theory advanced by the landowner 360 When the
municipality's own theory was rejected by the trial court, the
municipality requested the opportunity to cross-examine the
landowner's witnesses on the issues framed. The court held that
entry of judgment without permitting that examination "deprived
the town of its right to present its case." '361 The court observed
that the town had elected against opposing the adversary's appli-
cation, resting instead on its own theory in a parallel applica-
tion."2 Just as cross-motions do not obviate the trial judge's obli-
gation to study the facts needed for judgment, neither should a
cross-motion or different view of the legal theory immunize a
party from the need to respond to a pending summary judgment
motion directly and indicate which material facts are disputed
that preclude entry of judgment. With the rules in their present
form, there is little alternative to such results. However, it is
lation. Ciejek v. Laird, 380 S.E.2d 639, 641-42 (Va. 1989).
357. 366 S.E.2d 100 (Va. 1988).
358. Id. at 103.
359. Id. at 104.





clear that efficient and fair procedure would require a party who
believes that a cross-motion will be successful to respond to the
initial motion and advance the cross-motion separately To do
otherwise deprives the trial judge of the adversarial arguments
that permit an intelligent ruling on whether summary adjudi-
cation is appropriate. 6 '
C. The Need for Effective Docket Management.
The appellate-filing crisis has caused most jurisdictions to
enact procedural reforms and court system expansions over the
last twenty to forty years." In recent years, Virginia has re-
newed its focus upon the impact of an appellate filing volume
which has nearly doubled in the last ten years.6 5 Efforts are
underway to study and address the results of that increase. 66
By comparison, the increasing caseload visited upon the trial
judges in the Commonwealth of Virginia is staggering. Total
dispositions in the Virginia trial courts are up from 129,000 in
1980 to 216,000 in 1992.367 The number of civil case filings fac-
ing Virginia trial judges is among the highest in the nation on a
per capita basis, 3' averaging 9,728 per judge in the district
courts and 813 per judge in the circuit courts.6 9 Some metro-
politan circuits have a much higher than average share of this
case load.370
363. For an example of the simple rule provisions that would be sufficient to
acleve tins result, see znfra text immediately following note 438.
364. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATS.
ANN. REP. 1991, at 49-61 (1993) [hereinafter STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS].
365. The caseload of the Court of Appeals of Virginia has grown from 1,641 filings
m 1985, to 2,611 m 1992, and the proportion of crinmal appeals that the court
hears has dropped to approximately one-fifth of the applications for a hearing.
JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW 1992, supra note 201, at A36-37.
366. See APPELLATE REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, A REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIA-
TION (1994).
367. JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW 1992, supra note 201, at A47.
368. STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 364, at 11, Chart 1.6; see also
rd. at 9 (showing that Virginia ranks third among all states in general civil case
filings).
369. JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW 1992, supra note 201, at A52, A73.
370. In the general district court, the per-judge case load ranges from 2,090 per
judge in the 30th District, to 22,506 m the 13th District. In the eircuit courts, the
case load ranges from a low of 508 per judge in the 11th Circuit, to a high of 1,178
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Despite this volume explosion in Virginia, the "reform direc-
tion" of the summary judgment rule has been, if anything, more
restrictive. In the last twenty years, the rule has been amended
to exclude depositions, the "no duty" formulation was born, and
proposals to comprehensively reform the rule have divided the
bar and have failed to be successful. This combination causes
untoward incentives, forum shopping, and inefficiency and pro-
vides little protection for parties. No reason exists why the rule
should not be reformed to meet current needs.
1. Critcism and Efforts to Reform the Summary Judgment
Rule
Concern about the restrictive nature of summary judgment in
Virginia is not a phenomenon of recent origin. Almost immedi-
ately after the adoption of Rule 3:18 and other rules governing
pretrial procedures in 1950,71 commentators noticed the dis-
tinctive qualities of the Virginia system.72 Some of these writ-
ers have advocated restrictive or expansive utilization of the rules
in anticipation of interpretative case law ... Using the federal
model as a benchmark for comparison, these commentators
sought to explain or justify the relative lackof emphasis on pre-
trial procedure and the terse terminology of the rules as resulting
from a strictly adversarial jurisprudence that underlies Virginia
per judge m the 12th Circuit. The statewide average circuit court judicial caseload is
813 cases per judge. JUDICIARY'S YEAR IN REVIEW 1992, supra note 201, at A52, A73.
371. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR VIRGINIA, PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1949) (describing the intended operation of proposed dis-
covery and summary judgment rules).
372. See Chappell, supra note 52, at 151; J. Sloan Kuykendall, Pretrial Conference:
A Dissent from the Bar, 45 VA. L. REV. 147 (1959) (criticizing pretrial practice m
favor of "adversary system"); Elliott Marshall, Pretrial Conference: An Endorsement
From the Bench, 45 VA. L. REV. 141 (1959); Terry, supra note 25, at 353; Wright,
supra note 5, at 118 (noting, in 1959, that in Virginia "discovery, though possible, is
quite limited").
373. See Chappell, supra note 52, at 160-61 (advocating Virginia's middle of the
road approach to discovery and noting that summary judgment can be used to
"force[] the party against whom it is requested to produce sufficient proof to demon-
strate that there is a genuine dispute"); Kuykendall, supra note 372, at 147-48 (urg-
ing that pretrial conference be given only limited purpose and scope); Marshall, supra





These responses to the rules recognized the interrelation be-
tween the three elements of pretrial practice-summary judg-
ment, discovery, and the pretrial conference.375 In 1950, atten-
tion focused particularly upon the discovery rules due to the
limitations they placed upon the scope and use of depositions,
interrogatories, and requests for documents and admissions. 37
The 1971 revision of the discovery rules followed the then-exist-
ing federal model. 77 The summary judgment rule, however, was
only amended marginally to allow partial summary judgments on
liability 1 7  Controversy surrounding the adoption of a pretrial
conference rule was also the source of comment.379 Commenta-
tors reacted most strongly to the restrictive nature of the types of
evidentiary materials that could be used to support a motion for
summary judgment under the rule.380 Observers predicted that
374. See Chappell, supra note 52, at 160 (noting restrictive strain of Virgina law);
Kuykendall, supra note 372, at 149 (arguing that participation by judge in pretrial
conference procedures may call impartiality into question and that attorney control of
cases is appropriate); Terry, supra note 25, at 373 (restrictions on use of evidentiary
materials in summary judgment "is not mconsistent with long established Virgina
ideas on the importance of the adversary system of administering the law").
375. Chappell, supra note 52, at 160 (arguing that availability of summary judgment
may act to promote discovery); Marshall, supra note 372, at 143 (noting that pretrial
conference provides an opportunity for judge to use summary judgment when the
record discloses no relevant facts in issue); Terry, supra note 25, at 358 ("[Sluccess
of summary judgment in acuevmg those ends wich it is designed to achieve is
closely related to the existence of other 'code' procedures of discovery, pretrial prac-
tices, and related provisions similar to those in the Federal Rules.").
376. See generally Chappell, supra note 52, at 153-60.
377. See Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: Practice and Pleading 58 VA. L.
REV. 1309, 1323-25 (1972) [hereinafter Virginia Law Survey]. Ironically, a 1951 com-
mentary had expressed the hope that summary judgment would aid discovery under
the restrictive rules of 1950. See Chappell, supra note 52, at 160 ("Of the adopted
rules of practice and procedure, Rule [3:18] provides a potential source of discovery
aid in the form of summary judgment. This procedure, testing the genuineness of
issue, forces the party against whom it is requested to produce sufficient proof to
demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute."). Instead, the broad federal discovery
rules were adopted while summary judgment grew more firmly entrenched in its
unreformed state, growing even more restrictive when Virginia banned depositions
and adopted a "no duty" rule. See supra parts III.B.1, III.B.3.
378. See Virginia Law Survey, supra note 377, at 1322.
379. See Kuykendall, supra note 372, at 147-53; Marshall, supra note 372, at 141-
47.
380. Terry, supra note 25, at 373 (finding that the omission of a comprehensive list
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the restrictions would promote the under utilization of summary
judgment and inefficiencies in pretrial procedure. 8'
Although they accepted, to various degrees, Virginia's choice
not to base reforms upon the widely-followed federal model,382
the early commentators recognized some of the problems likely to
flow from the lack of integration between the modern concepts of
summary judgment and Virginia's pretrial system. Foreshadow-
ing the restrictive interpretations that would follow in subse-
quent supreme court applications of Rule 3:18, these early anal-
yses provided persuasive recognition that the text of the rule
serves as a hindrance to the efficient use of summary judgment
in the modern motion context. They also showed that the restric-
tiveness of Virginia summary judgment could be predicted from a
strain of jurisprudential conservativeness underlying the law
In recent years, the focus of reform has shifted from the acad-
emy to the organized bar, which has grappled with the rule in an
effort to propose amendments for consideration by the judicia-
ry 383 The Boyd Graves Conference considered summary judg-
ment proposals at its Fall, 1992, meeting in Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia. The Conference voted sixty-six-to-thirty in favor of the
central thrust of the proposal to abolish Code section 8.01-420,
the section which restricts use of depositions on summary judg-
ment.84 Subsequently, at a meeting of the Board of Governors
of the Litigation Section of the Virginia Bar Association,
of available evidentiary materials, "perhaps more than any other single feature of
Rule [3:18,] violates the spirit of the summary judgment procedural reform").
381. Id., Twentieth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: Practice and
Pleadings, 61 VA. L. REV. 1799, 1805 (1975) (predicting that the deposition ban "may
make scrutiny more difficult and the use of summary judgment rarer and less well-
informed").
382. Terry, Chappell, and Kuykendall each recognized that Virginia's adversary ju-
risprudence influenced the procedural structure. See Chappell, supra note 52, at 160;
Kuykendall, supra note 372, at 147; Terry, supra note 25, at 358 ("[i]t is logical that
the adoption of the summary judgment rule in Virginia be geared to the background
of Virginia procedure and not the wholesale adoption of the letter of the Federal
Rules.").
383. See, e.g., Kuykendall, supra note 372 (giving a self-styled "dissent from the
bar" from anti-pretrial conference view with strong endorsement of antimanagerial, or
adversarial, jurisprudence).
384. A bill to abrogate § 8.01-420 was before the Legislature in early 1993, but the
bill died. The same proposal was put forward in the 1994 session, and was carried
over to the 1995 legislative session where it again failed.
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attendees unequivocally endorsed the statutory revision. After
discussions with several plaintiffs' lawyers, the Board also altered
the rule revision proposal, eliminating the requirement that the
party opposing a summary judgment motion must come forward
with "significant probative evidence," in order to avoid any impli-
cation that a greater than normal showing is required to avoid
summary judgment."5 Instead, the proposal focuses on whether
a party has established the existence of a factual dispute that
should be tried. This language is in accord with the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Litigation Section leaders
voted fifteen-to-one in favor of the proposal thus adjusted in light
of the concerns of the plaintiffs' bar, which was also endorsed by
the Executive Committee of the VBA.88
Advocates also have advanced rule revisions in legislative and
judicial rulemaking forums. Rule changes can be made by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, even with the Code unchanged. After
discussion at its April, 1993, meeting, the Advisory Commit-
tee5 7 unanimously recommended to the Judicial Council that
the Supreme Court take action with respect to a comprehensive
reform of the summary judgment rule.88 The Judicial Council
approved the concept of abolishing the code limitations on sum-
mary judgment and approved a draft summary judgment rule
similar to the one we propose below 89 The court thereafter
declined to promulgate the rule revision, and the legislature con-
tinues to consider the abolition of the deposition ban provi-
sion. 390
385. See supra note 338.
386. Notes on file with authors.
387. The Advisory Committee is appointed by the Cuef Justice of the Supreme
Court of Virgirna to assist the Judicial Council of Virgina.
388. See Judicial Council of Virgina, agenda materials, June 28, 1993, items Ill-B
and III-D, on file with authors.
389. Notes of June 28, 1993 meeting of the Judicial Council of Virgina, on file with
authors.
390. Notes of report by Robert N. Baldwin, Executive Secretary of the Supreme
Court of Virgina, at meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice, Sept.
22, 1993, on file with Authors.
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2. Traditional or "Antz-managerial" Qualities of Rules
Governing Virginia Summary Judgment and Pretrial
Procedure
As discussed above, Rule 3:18 does not specify the procedure to
be followed nor the evidentiary materials permitted in support of,
and in opposition to, motions."' Under the rule, a judge may
not enter "partial summary judgments," in the form of a pretrial
order, or otherwise, on issues that do not fully resolve a claim of,
or defense to, liability 392 The rule also fails to provide time
guidelines for the parties.3 93 Most importantly, it fails to specify
what satisfies the movant's burden of production on "no proof'
motions394 or the motion respondent's burden of production
once a movant has "supported" the motion.3 9
The effects of these and other characteristics of Virginia pre-
trial practice are fairly predictable. There are two primary effects.
First, control over the range of pretrial preparation steps, and
their pace, is largely in the discretion of the parties. 96 A plain-
tiff does not have to engage in significant discovery to bolster a
claim against summary judgment because the plaintiff may, in
many cases, rely on the pleadings.397 Conversely, a defendant
who is aware of the plaintiff's advantage is less likely to under-
take the substantial effort required to attack a plaintiff's claim at
the pretrial phase, which would reveal much of the defendant's
evidence and theory of defense. In addition, either party may file
a "late" motion for summary judgment, which delays the trial
proceedings while a motion is considered.
A second effect of Virginia's pretrial practice weakness is that
trial remains the only available forum for testing a claim or de-
fense. In other words, a party is left with virtually no screening
391. See supra part III.B.6.
392. See VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18.
393. See id. It should be noted that, unlike Federal Rule 16, Virginia does not pro-
vide a rule mandating pretrial scheduling orders or pretrial conferences. See generally
VA. SUP CT. R. 4:13 (leaving the requirement of a pretrial conference to the discre-
tion of the court).
394. See supra part III.B.1.
395. See VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18.
396. See id.
397. See supra part III.B.1.
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mechanism in some cases. In the twentieth century, for example,
there are more reported instances of mid-trial dismissals for lack
of evidentiary sufficiency than there are pretrial summary
judgments, 98 with the attendant social and economic costs that
arise from allowing half a trial before the court assesses whether
the proof is so lacking that further proceedings are unwarranted.
These two effects severely undermine the dual functions of
summary judgment motions-gatekeeping and issue focusing.399
In Virginia, the summary judgment device is simply too weak to
act as a catalyst for sufficient evidence production, which is nec-
essary in order to predict reliably the existence of triable issues,
or to define their scope.
Although the rulemakers did not provide the bar with any
extensive underlying policy for Virginia's present summary judg-
ment rules,400 one can surmise that Virginia has followed a de-
liberate policy in pretrial practice. This policy is not so much a
positive policy as a negative or reactionary one. Virginia summa-
ry judgment procedure is "antimanagerial" because it neither
recognizes nor effectuates judicial efficiency alms." 1 If an affir-
398. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
400. When present Rules 3:18 and 2:21 were adopted, it was not the practice of the
Advisory Committee or the Judicial Council to publish any commentary or explana-
tion. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P 56 (providing advisory committee note with commentary on
summary judgment rule). But see JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR VIRGINIA, PROPOSED MODI-
FICATIONS OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 27-29 (1949) (describing the intended opera-
tion of proposed discovery and summary judgment rules).
401. Requiring the procedure to be managerial, elevates judicial efficiency consid-
erations to a level roughly equal to that of fairness and justice considerations. The
court's duty to do justice is thus a dual responsibility-to protect the parties and to
manage correctly the institution for the maximum social benefit. Tins role involves
controlling several aspects of preparation, timing, and application of discretionary
rules, with an eye toward reaching a speedy resolution in the interests of extrinsic
values. The courts' role is "referee-like" in that it requires more than just calling
balls or strikes; it also entails monitoring time use, regulating parties' strategic deci-
sions, and imposing sanctions for failure to follow well-established, clear, and mnm-
mum procedures. The court must strike a balance between justice in the case, in-
cluding a recognition of the parties' relative bargaining positions and judicial effi-
ciency.
Traditional judicial roles were non-managerial and did not elevate judicial effi-
ciency as a value at all. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77. The traditional
approach is largely responsive, viewing the judge's dominant function to be the
Solomomc resolution of issues selected, prepared, and presented as the parties may
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mative description for Virginia policy exists, it is that Virginia
policy is "adversarial" or "traditional" because it dissuades trial
judges from using pretrial procedures to resolve disputes or is-
sues.4"2 Either party may rely on the weakness of summary
judgment to provoke a full-blown trial, where even a weak claim
or defense may, against the odds, survive a motion to strike and
convince a jury
3. Untoward Incentives of the Present Situation
It is evident to any observer of the legal system that, in com-
parison to the current Virginia practice, the federal courts pro-
vide a more fully articulated summary judgment mechanism.4 "'
The comparative weaknesses of Virginia's approach has reached
such a level of public recognition that the Virginia Board of Bar
Examiners made it the subject of its Civil Procedure question on
the 1993 Bar Exam.0 4
wish.
402. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976) (noting that in a "traditional" litigation model, the
"process is party-initiated and party-controlled"); see also Chappell, supra note 52, at
151, 160 (noting school of thought that discovery in Virginia should be restricted and
tying it to old common law adversarial concept); Kuykendall, supra note 372, at 147-
53 (subscribing to Virginia's "adversary system"); Terry, supra note 25, at 373 (com-
menting that the course of restricting evidentiary material available in summary
judgment is "not inconsistent with long-established Virgima ideas on the importance
of the adversary system of administering the law").
403. See supra part III.B.
404. Va. Bar Exam, July 27, 1993, § 1, Question 1. The question read as follows:
1. Lindy Lawyer, counsel for Paula Plaintiff, filed a motion for judg-
ment in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, alleging that Dan
Defendant's negligent operation of his automobile on Duke Street in Alex-
andria, Virginia, was the sole proximate cause of personal injuries and
property damage sustained by Paula.
Dan Defendant, a forty year old college professor who lives and
works in Fairfax County, retains Able Attorney. Able timely files grounds
of defense on Dan's behalf, denying all material allegations, but admitting
that the posted speed limit all along Duke Street in Alexandria, Virgima,
is 25 miles per hour.
Without any discussion or agreement about discovery or evidentiary
matters, Lindy and Able thereafter exchange interrogatories, requests for
the production of documents, and notices of deposition. Lindy and Able
each believe that inquiries about the occurrence of an accident such as
1714
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One positive aspect of the disparity is that a defendant who
can satisfy the diversity jurisdiction requirements may elect to
remove from a Virginia court to a federal court."' After remov-
al, plaintiffs lose the protection of the "no duty" rule and must
produce evidence to survive a summary judgment motion.4"8
this are most productively raised m depositions whpre one receives the
candid response of the deponent-unfiltered by counsel. For that reason,
their mterrogatories and document requests focus on damage issues and
the identification of witnesses.
In the course of Dan's deposition, Dan states under oath that his
automobile was travelling at a speed of 35-40 miles per hour at the time
of the collision with Paula's vehicle. Dan also states, during his deposi-
tion, that at the time of the collision Paula's automobile was stopped
properly with its turn signal on, waiting to make a right hand turn.
Lmdy Lawyer is so delighted with this development that, immediately
following the conclusion of the deposition without any discussion with
Able, he returns to Ins office and files a motion for summary judgment
on the issue of liability.
(a) You are the Circuit Court judge. How do you rule on Lmdy's
motion for summary judgment?
(b) Assume instead that Lindy properly files a complaint in the Alex-
andria Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia and that Able timely files an answer; all other facts are
as stated above. You are the Federal District Court judge. How do you
rule on the motion for summary judgment?
405. In each of the following cases, decided after Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986), the court granted summary judgment for the defendant after the case had
been removed from Virgmia district court: Greenway Invs. v. Signet Bank, No. 92-
1497, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 8231 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 1993); Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d
774 (4th Cir. 1993); Akers v. Food Lion, Inc., No. 91-2725, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
18583 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1992); RGI Inc. v. Unified Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 658 (4th
Cir. 1992); Stewart v. Food Lion, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14148 (W.D. Va. Sept.
27, 1993); Holden v. Clary, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19951 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 1992);
Perry Eng. Co. v. AT&T Commumcations, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12332 (W.D.
Va. July 31, 1992), aft'd, 998 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyd v. Rubbermaid Com-
mercial Prods., Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20455 (W.D. Va. Dec. 11, 1992); Gulati v.
Coyne Int'l Enters., 805 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Va. 1992); Mayfield v. City of Va. Beach,
780 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Va. 1992); Faulknier v. Heritage Fin. Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15748 (W.D. Va. May 20, 1991); Freedlander, Inc. v. NCNB Nat'l Bank, 706
F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 921 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1990).
406. See, e.g., Akers, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18583, at *2 (holding that plaintiff
failed to make a sufficient showing that defendant had any notice of dangerous con-
dition on business premises); RGI, 963 F.2d at 661-62 (finding that trial judge appro-
priately refused to accept supplemental affidavit of plaintiff-respondent after granting
summary judgment for defendant based on plaintiffs absence of proof of damages);
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The federal trial judge will examine attached depositions and
affidavits, rendering judgment on this evidence. 0 7 Virginia fed-
eral trial judges also are required by the Fourth Circuit to fulfill
an "affirmative obligation to prevent 'factually unsupported
claims and defenses' from proceeding to trial. 40
8
Two other factors make removal to federal court an attractive
option for defendants seeking summary judgment. First, the
Eastern District of Virginia is one of the leading managerial
courts in the federal system." 9 Summary judgment motions are
frequently made, and there is no evidence that the Eastern Dis-
trict disfavors such applications.410 Pretrial case resolution is an
express goal of local court rules and procedures, which carefully
control the pace and scope of discovery and involve the judge in
pretrial procedure." Second, the Fourth Circuit rarely reverses
summary judgment decisions by the trial courts."2 Once re-
solved, the judgment most likely will stick, creating less fear of
protracted appeal, the full costs of trial on remand, and the divul-
gence of the movant's theory of the case.
Thus, the present Virginia posture encourages litigants to
make strategic forum choices due to the disparities between state
and federal procedural systems. Forum shopping is encouraged
because some defendants will perceive that they can quickly
Stewart, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19951, at *6-11 (stating that "this Court can only
consider the claims and evidence before it"); Holden, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995, at
*9-13 (holding that plaintiff had presented no affidavits or other evidence to substan-
tiate essential allegation of libel claim).
407. Drewitt, 999 F.2d at 776-78; Stewart, 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14148, at *3-10;
Holden, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19951, at *2.
408. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24).
409. See Dayton, supra note 113, at 449.
410. Using the same LEXIS computer searching procedure discussed, supra note
120, we have found that the post-1985 success rate of summary judgment motions in
the Eastern District of Virgima trial courts is approximately 69% (259 granted/117
denied). The success rate for the years 1975-1985 was approximately 64% (128
granted/71 denied). Cf supra text accompanying notes 213-27 (discussing studies of
summary judgment success rates in Virgima courts and in federal courts generally).
411. See Dayton, supra note 113, at 489-91.
412. In McLauchlan's study, the Fourth Circuit had the lowest reversal rate of sum-
mary judgments of any circuit. See McLauchlan, supra note 213, at 449 (showing a
26.7% reversal rate in the Fourth Circuit between 1938 and 1977, compared to a fed-
eral average of 49%).
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reach and resolve the merits of a claim in the federal forum,
while Virginia procedure will require a trial in virtually all in-
stances. At the same time, removal cannot significantly reduce
Virginia's volume problem; the restrictions on diversity jursdic-
tion ensure that any reduction is marginal at best.
4. Has the Time Come for More Effective Tools zn the Tral
Court?
Several recent developments suggest that the time has come to
review the tools we provide to Virginia trial courts in order to aid
them in dealing with their dockets. First, the sheer volume of the
case load, in the aggregate and on a per judge basis, is a key con-
sideration.
Second, there is a clearly-recognized Virginia policy that
crowded dockets are not an excuse for delaying the adjudication
of pending cases. In 1991, with the active support of the Judicial
Council and Chief Justice Harry Carrico, Virginia adopted time
standards for the disposition of cases.413
Third, interested parties have increasingly recognized the need
for new techniques for diverting cases that should not languish
on the circuit court docket pending a full trial. The Virginia Leg-
islature adopted the modern Uniform Arbitration Act in
1986,414 and in 1991, the Supreme Court of Virginia took a very
expansive view of the process by which parties consent to submis-
sion of their disputes to this alternative forum. 5 In 1991, the
Supreme Court of Virginia also established an Office of Dispute
Resolution Services within its own staff, to encourage the diver-
sion of cases to dispute resolution projects of various sorts. 6
This emphasis on shunting a proportion of the pending cases to
mediation and other ADR programs led to the 1993 enactment of
a statutory scheme that empowers all Virginia courts to refer
413. Robert Smith Midford, Carrico to Judges: Press Ahead on Time Standards, 5
VA. LAW. WKLY. 1161 (1991). The standards are, however, merely aspirational. Peter
D. Vieth, Assembly Rebuffs Judicial Council Time Standards 5 VA. LAW. WKLY. 833
(1991).
414. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577, 8.01-581.01 to .16 (Miclue Supp. 1994).
415. McMullin v. Umon Land & Management Co., 410 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1991).
416. William B. Spong, Jr., Mediation of Legal Disputes May Be Preferable to a Day
in Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 2, 1991, at A6.
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civil cases to a program of early neutral evaluation, by persons
trained and qualified by the court. 17
Fourth, the Judicial Council's ongoing effort to assure that the
mechanisms of pretrial discovery work efficiently in the Com-
monwealth also suggests the need for better summary judgment
procedures. The discovery tools are designed to explore facts and
to nail them down. Of course, the goals of this process are reduc-
ing "surprise" at trial and permitting more efficient proofs at
trial. It is stunning, however, to consider that a procedural sys-
tem that authorizes and encourages that level of investment in
the pretrial exploration of the facts fails to provide adequately for
that minority of cases in which the factual exegesis makes it clear
that a claim or defense is doomed for lack of any cognizable
proof. Discovery should not simply provide more evidence to the
parties; it should lead to more efficient dispositions at trial and
during the pretrial phase if the case meets traditional summary
judgment standards.
Fifth, the Virginia Legislature's enactment of sanctions in
Code section 8.01-271.1,418 and the Supreme Court of Virginia's
careful explanation of that Code provision's application,419
should be seen as a statement that the system must pay greater
attention to marginal claims and defenses. An effective summary
judgment rule reflects the same assessment: that in a small share
of the cases, out of optimism, lack of complete information, or
error, a party may have advanced a claim or defense for which
there is not sufficient factual support to warrant a trial. A viable
summary judgment procedure provides a crucial alternative to a
stark two-choice regime, in which the truly egregious cases war-
rant sanctions while all other cases are tried. Clearly, the largest
class of cases will have at least "some evidence" warranting pre-
sentation to the trier of fact at trial. An effective summary judg-
ment device, however, gives the system a tool that a court may
employ in reviewing factually questionable claims, assuring that
cases having no triable issue do not clog the trial docket.
417. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.4 to -. 12 (Michie Supp. 1994).
418. See zd. § 8.01-271.1.
419. See Tullidge v. Board of Supervisors, 391 S.E.2d 288 (Va. 1990).
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IV PROPOSED REvISION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN VIRGINIA.
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF THE CIVIL DOCKET
This section sets forth a proposed revision of the Virginia sum-
mary judgment rule that ameliorates the difficulties articulated
above. O The standard for summary judgment would not be
changed by this revision, but the practical utility and fairness of
the device, and the feasibility of trial court task management,
would be aided greatly For ease of reference, the rule is present-
ed as a whole in Appendix A to this Article, and is reprinted in
segments for discussion purposes.
Basic standards and applicability The goal of summary judg-
ment rule revision is not to increase significantly the share of
cases disposed of by this mechanism. Because neither case law
nor commentators have identified any defect in the statement of
the basic summary judgment test in Virginia,42 the proposed
rule revision preserves the language and approach of existing
practice in these respects:
(a) AVAILABILITY; TIMING. Either party may make a motion
for summary judgment at any time after the parties are at
issue.
(b) STANDARD. The court shall grant summary judgment
where there is no genuine dispute as to one or more material
questions of fact, such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on one or more dispositive issues
in the case.
(c) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The court may grant
partial summary judgment as to one or more issues. Existence
of disputed questions as to damages or other relief shall not
preclude summary judgment on issues of liability
These provisions are intended to preserve the core of the pres-
ently articulated Rules of Court in Virginia.422
Inztiating a Summary Judgment Motion. Much of the academic
420. See supra part III.C.
421. See United Leasing Corp., v. Thrift Ins. Corp., 440 S.E.2d 902, 903 (Va. 1994).
422. See VA. SUP CT. R. 3:18.
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criticism of present federal practice, and a large share of the
plaintiffs' bar's concern about Virginia summary judgment prac-
tice improvements, appears to center on the issue of how a party
commences the motion.423 The guiding concern is that a party
may initiate a motion with a boilerplate notice generated from an
all-purpose text file residing on the computer for use on unsus-
pecting adversaries.424 In reviewing models of rules that artic-
ulate the movant's obligations, the goal has been to respect these
concerns, while also assuring that the papers actually focus on
potentially dispositive issues, and that the motion and response
process equips the trial judge with the informational ammunition
needed to deal effectively with the issues. Thus, this Article ad-
vances a provision that looks unlike any federal or state rule we
have yet located, as it suggests a relatively unburdensome means
of requiring the movant to keep the motion focused tightly upon
dispositive matters.
(d) SUPPORTING THE MOTION. The movant shall support a
motion for summary judgment by submitting:
(i) a statement of material facts not genuinely in dispute,
set forth in numbered paragraphs. This statement shall pres-
ent a limited number of factual or fact/law issues which the
movant represents will be dispositive of all or part of a claim
or defense. For each such issue the statement shall identify
illustrative sources of the legal rule that makes the point
essential to the claim or defense being challenged, and any
evidence on which the movant relies to negate or establish the
material fact. If the movant contends that there is no admissi-
ble evidence supporting a material fact on which the
nonmovant has the burden of proof, the statement shall de-
scribe the steps taken by the movant to review discovery ma-
terials and other available sources of information for evidence
to negate or establish that material fact; and
(ii) such other materials permitted by law as the moving
party may elect, including memoranda of law, affidavits from
423. See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 105, at 37 & n.15.
424. One participant at the 1993 Boyd-Graves Conference on Virginia Procedure
commented that a move to more highly articulated summary judgment procedures
could cause Virginia litigators accustomed to fairly gentle motion practice habits to
face aggressive motions. Linda Laibstam, former Virginia State Bar Litigation Section
Chair, Remarks at the 1993 Boyd-Graves Conference on Virgina Procedure.
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persons with personal knowledge of pertinent facts, docu-
ments, interrogatory answers, responses to requests for ad-
missions, and other matter.
In effect, this approach modifies existing "statement of materi-
al facts" rules found in many local courts in other jurisdictions,
and incorporates them into the Virginia summary judgment rule.
The proposed provision requires the movant to identify the factu-
al and legal issues on which the adversary has the burden of
persuasion, specifying the factual showings contended to be nec-
essary to plaintiff's success. The rule then would require that the
movant identify any supporting proof on which it intends to rely
when negating the fact issue on which the plaintiff has the bur-
den, and to state specifically whether a review of the pretrial
record and other appropriate sources of information fail to dis-
close evidence sufficient to meet the burden.
Note that this proposal also addresses one of the most vocifer-
ously expressed concerns about federal court summary judgment
that arose after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of deci-
sions. This concern is that a movant may, with the expenditure
of very little effort, time, or expense, assert the absence of proof
on a variety of issues, placing a great burden upon the plaintiff to
do substantial research and drafting in order to demonstrate
enough proof to make the assailed issues viable topics for fact
finding at trial.425 The proposed rule, on the other hand, re-
quires the movant to provide a detailed list of each individual fact
issue or fact/law issue on which the plaintiff's claim assertedly
founders. Because the movant must articulate evidence that
establishes her view of the identified issues, or must recite af-
firmatively the nature of the record search used to ascertain
whether any conceivable proof on the matter favorable to the
plaintiff exists, making such a motion is not "cost free" to the
movant. The approach here advocated is calculated to undermine
any incentive for movants to make broad motions with the dilato-
ry purpose of burdening the other side. Although this deterrent
value in requiring specificity in the movant's papers will be at-
tractive to some commentators, the more important consequence
425. See Risinger, supra notes 105, at 37-42.
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of adopting such a requirement should probably be the process of
identifying specific issues for the trial court.
It would be possible to curtail the burdens generated by sum-
mary judgment applications even further We believe that the
court should experiment with a rule that requires the movant to
limit herself to claiming a specified number of fatal defects in the
plaintiff's case. It would be instructive, for example to gain expe-
rience under a rule, which would restrict summary judgment
applications that are available as a matter of right to the identi-
fication of three fatal issues. As to each issue, the movant would
identify the legal basis and evidentiary support or record review
described above. This approach would vastly reduce the specter of
burdens imposed upon the plaintiff and would require the mov-
ant to select those legal or factual/legal errors that are the most
likely to be dispositive. Indeed, such an approach could be but-
tressed by an official form promulgated by the Judicial Council,
requiring, through a fill-in-the-blanks approach, both the movant
and the responding party to supply a succinct identification of
the source of the burden of proof and the nature of the evidentia-
ry support, or lack thereof, with respect to the elements identi-
fied.
The Responding Party's Submission. The key to effective use of
summary judgment is to require that the movant's submissions
pinpoint the alleged holes in plaintiffs case, whether in the form
of adverse facts or a total absence of supporting proof on a point
as to which plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. The near
hysteria with which some academic commentators and some
plaintiffs' lawyers view the obligations borne by the party with
the burden of proof revolves around the extent of the submission
that the burdened party must produce in response to a summary
judgment motion.426 The underlying aim, therefore, is to ad-
vance the goal of requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate enough to
give the trial judge a basis for recognizing a triable issue without
allowing the plaintiff's obligation to respond to become a burden-
some surrogate for other discovery devices or a test of pretrial





(e) RESPONDING TO THE MOTION. Where a summary judg-
ment motion has been made and supported as set forth in
subparagraph (d)(i) and (d)(ii) of this Rule, the party against
whom the motion has been filed may not rely upon averments
or denials in the pleadings, whether general or specific, to
demonstrate the existence of material questions of fact, but
shall respond to the motion by submitting:
(i) a statement of expected proof on the dispositive issues
as to which summary judgment has been sought, set forth in
paragraphs numbered to correspond to the statement accom-
panying the moving papers. The statement of expected proof
shall include a written proffer of illustrative evidence, reason-
ably expected to be admissible at trial, to address the issues on
which summary judgment has been sought, supported by
affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of pertinent
facts, and/or other competent proof, presenting examples of
testimony, documents, interrogatory answers, responses to
requests for admissions, or other specifically identified evi-
dence, sufficient to show that there is a triable question of fact
as to each of the material issues set forth in the moving pa-
pers; and
(ii) such other materials permitted by law as the party
opposing summary judgment may elect.
This portion of the proposed rule adopts the summary judg-
ment approach exemplified in most jurisdictions, which requires
that the party against whom the motion is made must come for-
ward with some specific facts that show that there is a triable
issue.42" The proposed rule proceeds from the premise that in
order for summary judgment to serve as a useful tool for trial
courts, it must be a means to ferret out the existence or nonexis-
tence of factual disputes, avoiding needless trials and preventing
baseless claims or defenses from clogging the courts and burden-
ing litigants. This approach provides that a mere averment or de-
nial in the pleadings is not sufficient to preclude summary judg-
ment. Thus, where a summary judgment motion is made and
properly supported under this rule, the opponent is required to
427. See, e.g., FED. R. CiV. P 56(e) (mandating that the adverse party "must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genume issue for trial").
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identify evidence that it will offer at a trial, presenting a bona
fide issue, on which reasonable persons might differ, for the trier
of fact.
The term "illustrative proof' expresses the notion that a plain-
tiff has discretion to select which items will be submitted in re-
sponse to the motion: summary judgment is not an occasion
where all proof is required, where proof on issues not raised by
the motion is needed, or where failure to advance alternative
items of proof will result in their being inadmissible.
Rather, a plaintiff should be required to submit enough evi-
dence to demonstrate that there will be a triable issue on each of
the material facts upon which the motion focuses. This require-
ment may mean that the plaintiff chooses to proffer one or two
elements of proof on the contested dispositive issues, but with-
holds other proof until the anticipated trial. If the shaping of the
motion papers achieves a narrowly-focused application, the re-
sponse can be kept short. With the proof submission issues de-
fined and delimited, a plaintiff who shoulders a greater response
burden does so voluntarily, for strategic or other purposes, such
as bolstering settlement discussions by intimidating the adver-
sary or indoctrinating the judge on the strength of her case by
stressing certain items of proof. No summary judgment rule can
foreclose such extra submissions, but a workable rule makes
them elective rather than necessary
The draft section on the response of the nonmoving party is
also calculated to focus the response on evidence "expected" to be
admissible.
By addressing the movant's obligation to identify evidence and,
more importantly, the respondent's obligation to oppose the mo-
tion through a demonstration that a triable fact issue exists, the
proposed rule seeks to make the key evidential point without
creating extra burdens on the plaintiff. The federal model re-
quires the plaintiff to put forth "significant probative evidence"
that supports the fact issues on which the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof. Essentially, this test has the effect of implying a
specific threshold of proof necessary to create a triable issue of
fact. The more crucial function that the rule should perform is to
force parties to focus on the admissibility of the evidentiary mat-
ter on which the burdened party will rely
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Thus, two issues must be separated. The first is whether the
plaintiff in an ordinary case (i.e., one in which a normal prepon-
derance of the evidence standard will apply at trial) is able to
identify any arguably admissible evidence that supports those
points that the movant has identified as lacking support. Those
cases that require a higher burden of proof also require a second
level of analysis in federal practice.
Under the doctrine announced in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc.,42 when a plaintiff must meet a higher-than-normal burden
of proof at trial, federal rules permit the trial court to assess
whether the evidence identified in a response to a summary judg-
ment motion could conceivably meet that higher standard.
29
This development does not appear to have thrown the federal
courts into turmoil, although several academic commentators
have joined Justice Brennan in assailing the logical integrity of
this approach when it is presented as being consistent with tradi-
tional summary judgment standards."' In 1994, the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided an appeal that can be read as adopting
the approach of Anderson sub silencio.43'
For simplicity, and to avoid the plaintiffs' bar's potentially
legitimate fear that this second level approach invites a judge to
weigh the evidence at a pretrial stage, the threshold of "some
evidence" should be codified in rule form in Virginia, at least at
the beginning. Admittedly, this approach would mean that some
defamation cases, paternity actions, or other proceedings that re-
quire a higher than normal burden of proof,"' may survive
summary judgment challenge if the plaintiff can identify any
cognizable evidence that supports the required elements. The re-
ported frequency of these actions that require higher standards of
proof, however, is small.433 Presently, the absence of an eviden-
tiary focus in the rule's procedure results in the absence of a
428. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
429. Id. at 254-56.
430. See zd. at 257-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
431. See Carstensen v. Crsland Corp., 442 S.E.2d 660 (Va. 1994) (applying at the
summary judgment stage the heightened "clear and convincing proof" standard gov-
ernig the merits of an easement claim).
432. CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 9-9 (4th ed. 1993).
433. See z&
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viable summary judgment procedure in all cases.
To further minimize the nonmovant's burden to identify evi-
dence expected to support issues for which summary judgment is
sought, the proposed rule speaks in terms of illustrative eviden-
tiary matter. In part, this language is adopted to avoid the
sometimes-voiced criticism that summary judgment can be used
as an elaborate discovery device by forcing a party to catalogue
all of its supporting evidence that will be argued at trial. The
proposed rule's approach is more narrowly circumscribed to meet
directly the goal of summary judgment. That goal is to assess the
specific dispositive factual propositions on which the movant
asserts that the adversary cannot prevail. This approach requires
the plaintiff to identify only "illustrative" evidentiary support,
leaving to the responding party the discretion to determine the
proportion of its evidence needed to defeat the summary judg-
ment motion. Some attorneys, no doubt, will be enticed to pres-
ent a large volume of information for the purpose of impressing
the trial judge with the strength of their case. But where that is
not a dominant motivation, the proposed rule would impose only
that level of obligation which the summary judgment standard
itself necessitates-demonstration that there is at least "some
evidence," arguably admissible, on which a rational juror could
find for the plaintiff on that issue. Thus the proposed rule avoids
suggesting a high threshold of proof and limits the plaintiff's
burden to selection of items sufficient to demonstrate a triable is-
sue, yet achieves the goal of assuring that the trial judge will
receive submissions directed to individual points. Accordingly, it
will be easier for a court to determine whether there are any
triable issues of material fact.
(f) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. A party making or responding to a
motion for summary judgment may make use of discovery
depositions except to the extent prohibited by statute.
In light of the extensive discussion of the problem of depositions
in Virginia summary judgment practice set forth earlier in this
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Article,434 no further explanatory treatment is offered here.
(g) INABILITY TO RESPOND. When a party against whom a
motion for summary judgment has been filed demonstrates
that, despite due diligence, affidavits or other materials essen-
tial for opposition to the motion have been unavailable, the
court may in the exercise of discretion grant a continuance to
permit an opportunity to obtain responsive material, through
discovery or otherwise. Where pertinent factual material need-
ed in responding to the motion is in the possession of the
party against whom the motion has been filed, no extension of
time to respond to the motion will be granted except upon a
showing of good cause for the delay
This paragraph provides for circumstances in which a summa-
ry judgment application is arguably made before the adversary
has had a fair opportunity to conduct discovery or otherwise
locate potentially admissible evidence on key points. It empowers
the trial court to defer consideration of the application in contem-
plation of specific discovery, or to delay hearing the motion for a
specified period of time in order to allow a fair opportunity to
develop responsive information from any other source.
Virginia trial judges may already have this power inherently,
although it is not explicit in Rule 3:18."'5 In general, it would
seem that most trial judges today would deny the motion and
give the plaintiff an opportunity at trial instead of ordering fur-
ther discovery 436
(h) CROSS-MOTIONS. A party against whom a motion for
summary judgment has been made may make a cross-motion
for summary judgment, subject to the other provisions of this
rule; the making of a cross-motion, whether based on matters
of fact or legal theory, does not relieve a party of the obliga-
434. See supra part III.B.3.
435. See VA. SUP. CT. R 3:18.
436. See, e.g., Demitn v. Virgua Fed. Say. & Loan, 14 Va. Cir. 137 (1988) (denymg
summary judgment when plamtiff has alleged essential ultimate fact m pleading).
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tion to respond in accordance with this rule to the adversary
party's motion.
This paragraph clarifies the parties' obligations when cross-
motions are filed. It provides that each party must respond to the
merits of the adversary's summary judgment motion, filing the
materials provided in the rule in order to demonstrate whether
material, factual questions exist on the matters identified in each
motion. It is not permissible, under this rule, for a party to lodge
a cross-motion on a different factual or legal theory as a form of
response to a pending summary judgment motion. Such a proce-
dure precludes resolution of the competing motions and may
deny a party judicial resolution on the facts presented. Under the
proposed rule, each summary judgment motion would be resolved
on its own merits. If the cross-motions are on different factual or
legal theories, they would be addressed. If the cross-motions
revolve around essentially the same facts, no greater work would
be required for the parties in casting their responsive materials.
V CONCLUSION
In the preceding sections, we identified certain characteristics
of Virginia summary judgment that hinder its effectiveness and
render it virtually useless: the doctrine that averments in the
pleadings can preclude summary judgment,"' the statute and
rule barring the use of deposition testimony on summary judg-
ment,43 the absence of express authority for the use of affida-
vits and other sources of proof,439 and the absence of a proce-
dural roadmap in the text of the governing rule, which could aid
the court and the parties to formulate summary judgment
issues.
440
Each of these problems has its roots in the text of the rule
itself; some of the limitations are positive qualities of the
437. See supra part III.B.1.
438. See supra part III.B.3.
439. See supra part III.B.2.
440. See supra part III.B.6.
1728
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REFORM
rule-such as the statutory ban on the use of depositions-and
some are problems of negative implication-such as the absence
of a duty to develop pleading allegations and the uncertainty of
the use of affidavits and other discovery material. In former
times, a policy implicitly discouraging judicial management has
sustained these limitations.4 '
Together, these limitations render Virginia summary judgment
an extremely ineffective procedure. Virginia trial judges grant
fewer summary judgments to plaintiffs or defendants than do
their federal counterparts.442 When summary judgment is grant-
ed, the lack of procedural guidelines often leads to errors. The
Supreme Court of Virginia is more likely to reverse those trial
courts which dispose of cases on summary judgment than are the
federal appellate courts.44
Despite the flavor of "plaintiffs versus defendants" in some of
the organized bar's discussions of summary judgment reform, the
motion's ineffectiveness actually poses potential risks to both
plaintiffs and defendants. The limitations of the present rule cast
doubt upon the usefulness of pretrial discovery and create vari-
ous inefficient incentives. The availability of removal to federal
court undercuts the Virginia preference for trial adjudication by
providing a strongly managerial alternative forum.44
The weakness of Virginia's summary judgment motion is con-
sistent with an antimanagerial, or hands-off, philosophy of the
courts' role.44 Fewer pretrial dispositions, however, result in
more cases going to trial. Of course, the value of a system that
stresses a party's autonomy to state a claim and arrogate the
right to a full hearing is that it favors the preservation of the
jury trial function. However, the wisdom of reflexively favoring
the trial forum, without the benefit of some effective pretrial
screening function that goes beyond the facial review of demurrer
practice, is questionable in the face of the complexity and volume
of modern Virginia litigation. Sanctions alone cannot assure that
there is a factual basis for a claim or defense sufficient to war-
441. See supra part II.C.
442. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
443. See supra text accompanying notes 216-19.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 405-12.
445. See supra part II.C.
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rant the cost to the parties and the investment of public resourc-
es that a full trial entails.
At bottom, given the stringent standards for granting summa-
ry judgment on the merits (at least in the core, "no proof' model
of the motion) the applicable dichotomy is not between the right
to a full trial and the efficiency costs of a high volume caseload.
When one party has shown, through a procedurally-fair summary
judgment process, that there are no material facts that present
any genuine issue, and that a party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on a claim or defense, the court's adjudicative task
is ended, and its services are more properly preserved for deserv-
ing plaintiffs and defendants in other cases waiting on the docket.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REFORM
APPENDIX A
Proposed Rule 3:18. Summary Judgment
(a) AvAILABILITY; TIMING. Either party may make a motion for
summary judgment at any time after the parties are at issue.
(b) STANDARD. The court shall grant summary judgment where
there is no genuine dispute as to one or more material questions
of fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on one or more dispositive issues in the case.
(c) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The court may grant partial
summary judgment as to one or more issues. Existence of dis-
puted questions as to damages or other relief shall not preclude
summary judgment on issues of liability
(d) SUPPORTING THE MOTION. The movant shall support a
motion for summary judgment by submitting:
(i) a statement of material facts not genuinely in dispute, set
forth in numbered paragraphs. This statement shall present a
limited number of factual or fact/law issues which the movant
represents will be dispositive of all or part of a claim or defense.
For each such issue the statement shall identify illustrative
sources of the legal rule that makes the point essential to the
claim or defense being challenged, and any evidence on which the
movant relies to negate or establish the material fact. If the mov-
ant contends that there is no admissible evidence supporting a
material fact on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof,
the statement shall describe the steps taken by the movant to
review discovery materials and other available sources of infor-
mation for evidence to negate or establish that material fact; and
(ii) such other materials permitted by law as the moving
party may elect, including memoranda of law, affidavits from
persons with personal knowledge of pertinent facts, documents,
interrogatory answers, responses to requests.for admissions, and
other matter.
(e) RESPONDING TO THE MOTION. Where a summary judgment
motion has been made and supported as set forth in subpara-
graph (d)(i) and (d)(ii) of this Rule, the party against whom the
motion has been filed may not rely upon averments or denials in
the pleadings, whether general or specific, to demonstrate the
existence of material questions of fact, but shall respond to the
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motion by submitting:
(i) a statement of expected proof on the dispositive issues as
to which summary judgment has been sought, set forth in para-
graphs numbered to correspond to the statement accompanying
the moving papers. The statement of expected proof shall include
a written proffer of illustrative evidence, reasonably expected to
be admissible at trial, to address the issues on which summary
judgment has been sought, supported by affidavits of persons
with personal knowledge of pertinent facts, and/or other compe-
tent proof, presenting examples of testimony, documents, inter-
rogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, or other
specifically identified evidence, sufficient to show that there is a
triable question of fact as to each of the material issues set forth
in the moving papers; and
(ii) such other materials permitted by law as the party op-
posing summary judgment may elect.
(f) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. A party making or responding to a
motion for summary judgment may make use of discovery depo-
sitions except to the extent prohibited by statute.
(g) INABILITY TO RESPOND. When a party against whom a mo-
tion for summary judgment has been filed demonstrates that,
despite due diligence, affidavits or other materials essential for
opposition to the motion have been unavailable, the court may in
the exercise of discretion grant a continuance to permit an oppor-
tunity to obtain responsive material, through discovery or other-
wise. Where pertinent factual material needed in responding to
the motion is in the possession of the party against whom the
motion has been filed, no extension of time to respond to the
motion will be granted except upon a showing of good cause for
the delay
(h) CROSS-MOTIONS. A party against whom a motion for sum-
mary judgment has been made may make a cross-motion for
summary judgment, subject to the other provisions of this rule;
the making of a cross-motion, whether based on matters of fact
or legal theory, does not relieve a party of the obligation to re-





Because the use of sworn submissions is important to making
summary judgment a workable tool, we conducted a survey of all
50 states to determine whether other jurisdictions permit use of
depositions and affidavits. All states, the District of Columbza,
and the federal courts, except Virginia, include affidavits among












































YES ALA. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES ALASKA Civ R. P 56(c)
YES ARIZ. R. CIV P 56(c)
YES ARK. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES CAL. CIV PROC. CODE §
437c(b) (West Supp. 1995)
YES COLO. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES CONN. SUPER. CT. R. Civ
CASES § 380
YES DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ R. P
56(c)
YES D.C. SUPER; CT. Civ R. P
56(c)
YES FLA. R. Civ P 1.510(c)
YES GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-
56(c) (1993)
YES HAW R. Civ P 56(c)
YES IDAHO R. Civ P 56(c)
YES ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735,
para. § 5/2-1005(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1992)
YES IND. TRIAL R. 56(C)
YES IOWA R. CIV P 237(c)
YES KAN. STAT ANN. § 60-
256(c) (Supp. 1993)
YES KY. R. Civ P 56.03
YES LA. CODE CIv PROC. ANN.
art. 966(B) (West Supp.
1994)
YES ME. R. Civ P 56(c)
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YES MD. R. CIv P CT. 2-501
YES MASS. R. CIV P 56(c)
YES MICH. CT. R. Civ P
2.116(G)(3)
YES MINN. R. Civ P 56.03
YES MIss. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES Mo. R. CIV P 74.04(c)
YES MONT. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES NEB. REV STAT. § 25-1332
(1989)
YES NEV R. Civ P 56(c)
YES N.H. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 491:8-a (III) (1983)
YES N.J. Civ PRAC. R. 4:46-2
YES N.M.R. Civ P DIST. CT. 1-
56(C)
YES N.Y Civ PRA. L. & R.
3212(b) (Consol. 1994)
YES N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1,
R. Civ P 56(c)
YES N.D. R. Civ P 56
YES OHIO R. Civ P 56(C)
YES OKLA. STAT. ANN. R. tit.
12, Ch. 2, App. 13
YES OR. R. Civ P 47(C)
YES PA. R. CIV P 1035(b)
YES R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ P
56(c)
YES S.C. R. Civ P 56(c)
YES S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-6-56(c) (1984)
YES TENN. R. Civ P 56.03
YES TEX. R. Civ P ANN. r.
166a(c) (West 19 )
YES UTAH R. Civ P 56(c)
YES VT. R. Civ P 56(c)
NO R. SuP CT. VA. 2:21, 3:18
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YES YES W VA. R. CIV P 56(c)
YES YES WIs. STAT. ANN. § 802-
08(2) (West 1994)
YES YES WYo. R. CIV P 56(c)
